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ABSTRACT
This study shows that past trading volume provides an important link between
“momentum” and “value” strategies. Specifically, we find that firms with high
~low! past turnover ratios exhibit many glamour ~value! characteristics, earn lower
~higher! future returns, and have consistently more negative ~positive! earnings
surprises over the next eight quarters. Past trading volume also predicts both the
magnitude and persistence of price momentum. Specifically, price momentum ef-
fects reverse over the next five years, and high ~low! volume winners ~losers! ex-
perience faster reversals. Collectively, our findings show that past volume helps to
reconcile intermediate-horizon “underreaction” and long-horizon “overreaction” effects.
FINANCIAL ACADEMICS AND PRACTITIONERS have long recognized that past trading
volume may provide valuable information about a security. However, there
is little agreement on how volume information should be handled and inter-
preted. Even less is known about how past trading volume interacts with
past returns in the prediction of future stock returns. Stock returns and
trading volume are jointly determined by the same market dynamics, and
are inextricably linked in theory ~e.g., Blume, Easley, and O’Hara ~1994!!.
Yet prior empirical studies have generally accorded them separate treatment.
In this study, we investigate the usefulness of trading volume in predict-
ing cross-sectional returns for various price momentum portfolios. The study
is organized into two parts. In the first part, we document the interaction
between past returns and past trading volume in predicting future returns
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2017over intermediate and long horizons.1 In the second part, we evaluate alter-
native explanations for these empirical regularities. Our findings extend the
literature on both price momentum and trading volume. In addition, we es-
tablish an important link between intermediate-horizon “momentum” and
long-horizon “value” strategies.
We contribute to the literature on price momentum in two ways. First, we
show that the price momentum effect documented by Jegadeesh and Titman
~1993! reverses over long horizons. Like Jegadeesh and Titman, we find no
significant price reversals through the third year following portfolio forma-
tion. However, over Years 3 through 5, we find that initial winner portfolios
significantly underperform initial loser portfolios. This finding is important
because it refutes the common presumption that price momentum is simply
a market underreaction. Instead, the evidence suggests that at least a por-
tion of the initial momentum gain is better characterized as an overreaction.2
Second, we show that past trading volume predicts both the magnitude
and the persistence of future price momentum. Specifically, high ~low! vol-
ume winners ~losers! experience faster momentum reversals. Conditional on
past volume, we can create Jegadeesh and Titman–type momentum portfo-
lios ~winners minus losers! that either exhibit long-horizon return reversals
or long-horizon return continuations. This evidence shows that the informa-
tion contained in past trading volume can be useful in reconciling intermediate-
horizon “underreaction” and long-horizon “overreaction” effects.
Our findings also extend the trading volume literature. Prior research
~e.g., Datar, Naik and Radcliffe ~1998!! shows that low ~high! volume firms
earn higher ~lower! future returns. We show that this volume effect is long
lived ~i.e., it is observable over the next three to five years! and is most
pronounced among the extreme winner and loser portfolios. More impor-
tantly, our evidence contradicts the common interpretation of trading vol-
ume as simply a liquidity proxy. These findings instead show that past trading
volume is related to various “value” strategies.
Contrary to the liquidity explanation, we find that high ~low! volume stocks
earn higher ~lower! average returns in each of the five years prior to port-
folio formation. We show that trading volume is only weakly correlated with
traditional liquidity proxies and that the volume effect is robust to various
risk adjustments. We find that the volume-based momentum effect holds
even in a subsample of the largest 50 percent of New York ~NYSE! and
American Stock Exchange ~AMEX! firms. Finally, we show that most of the
excess returns to volume-based strategies is attributable to changes in trad-
1 We use average daily turnover as a measure of trading volume. Turnover is defined as the
ratio of the number of shares traded to the number of shares outstanding. Any unqualified
reference to trading volume henceforth refers to this definition.
2 Studies that characterize price momentum as an underreaction include Jegadeesh and
Titman ~1993!, Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok ~1996!, Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny ~1998!,
and Hong and Stein ~1999!. Conversely, studies that characterize price momentum to be the
result of overreaction include DeLong et al. ~1990! and Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam
~1998!.
2018 The Journal of Financeing volume. Firms whose recent volume is higher ~lower! than volume four
years ago experience significantly lower ~higher! future returns. The change
in volume measures abnormal trading activity and is unlikely to be a liquid-
ity proxy.
On the other hand, we find that low ~high! volume stocks display many
characteristics commonly associated with value ~glamour! investing. Specif-
ically, lower ~higher! trading volume is associated with worse ~better! cur-
rent operating performance, larger ~smaller! declines in past operating
performance, higher ~lower! book-to-market ratios, lower ~higher! analyst
followings, lower ~higher! long-term earnings growth estimates, higher ~low-
er! factor loadings on the Fama–French HML factor, and lower ~higher! stock
returns over the previous five years.
Further analyses show that the higher ~lower! future returns experienced
by low ~high! volume stocks are related to investor misperceptions about
future earnings. Analysts provide lower ~higher! long-term earnings growth
forecasts for low ~high! volume stocks. However, low ~high! volume firms
experience significantly better ~worse! future operating performance. More-
over, we find that short-window earnings announcement returns are signif-
icantly more positive ~negative! for low ~high! volume firms over each of the
next eight quarters. The same pattern is observed for both past winners and
past losers. Evidently the market is “surprised” by the systematically higher
~lower! future earnings of low ~high! volume firms.
The fact that a market statistic widely used in technical analysis can pro-
vide information about relative under- or over-valuation is surprising and is
difficult to reconcile with existing theoretical work. To help explain these
results, we evaluate the predictions of several behavioral models. We con-
clude that each model has specific features that help explain some aspects of
our findings but that no single model accommodates all our findings. We
also discuss an interesting illustrative tool, dubbed the momentum life cycle
~MLC! hypothesis, that captures some of the most salient features of our
empirical results.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we
discuss related literature. In Section II, we describe our sample and meth-
odology. In Section III we present our empirical results. In Section IV, we
further explore the information content of trading volume and relate these
findings to several behavioral models. Finally, in Section V, we conclude with
a summary of the evidence and a discussion of the implications.
I. Related Literature
In recent years, a number of researchers have presented evidence that
cross-sectional stock returns are predictable based on past returns. For ex-
ample, DeBondt and Thaler ~1985, 1987! document long-term price reversals
in which long-term past losers outperform long-term past winners over the
subsequent three to five years. Similarly, Jegadeesh ~1990! and Lehmann
~1990! report price reversals at monthly and weekly intervals.
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turn continuations reported by Jegadeesh and Titman ~1993!. Forming port-
folios based on past three- to 12-month returns they show that past winners
on average continue to outperform past losers over the next three to 12
months. Although many competing explanations have been suggested for the
long-horizon price reversal patterns,3 far fewer explanations have been ad-
vanced to explain the intermediate-horizon price momentum effect.
For example, Fama and French ~1996! show that a three-factor model of
returns fails to explain intermediate-horizon price momentum. Chan, Jega-
deesh, and Lakonishok ~1996! show that intermediate-horizon return con-
tinuation can be partially explained by underreaction to earnings news but
that price momentum is not subsumed by earnings momentum. Rouwen-
horst ~1998! finds a similar pattern of intermediate-horizon price momen-
tum in 12 other countries, suggesting that the effect is not likely due to a
data snooping bias.
More recently, Conrad and Kaul ~1998! suggest that the momentum effect
may be due to cross-sectional variation in the mean returns of individual
securities. Moskowitz and Grinblatt ~1999! claim that a significant compo-
nent of firm-specific momentum can be explained by industry momentum.
However, the evidence in Grundy and Martin ~1998! suggests momentum
effects are not explained by time-varying factor exposures, cross-sectional
differences in expected returns, or industry effects.4 None of these studies
examine the interaction between past trading volume and past price move-
ments in predicting cross-sectional returns.
At least two theoretical papers suggest that past trading volume may pro-
vide valuable information about a security. Campbell, Grossman, and Wang
~1993! present a model in which trading volume proxies for the aggregate
demand of liquidity traders. However, their model focuses on short-run li-
quidity imbalances ~or volume shocks! of a daily or weekly duration and
makes no predictions about longer-term returns. Blume et al. ~1994! present
a model in which traders can learn valuable information about a security by
observing both past price and past volume information. However, their model
does not specify the nature of the information that might be derived from
past volume. We provide empirical evidence on the nature of this information.
Our study is also tangentially related to Conrad, Hameed, and Niden ~1994!.
Conrad et al. show that, at weekly intervals, the price reversal pattern is
observed only for heavily traded stocks; less traded stocks exhibit return
3 For example, DeBondt and Thaler ~1985, 1987! and Chopra, Lakonishok, and Ritter ~1992!
attribute long-term price reversals to investor overreaction. In contrast, Ball, Kothari, and
Shanken ~1995!, Conrad and Kaul ~1993!, and Ball and Kothari ~1989! point to market micro-
structure biases or time-varying returns as the most likely causes. Similarly, short-horizon
price reversals have been attributed to return cross-autocorrelations ~Lo and MacKinlay ~1990!!
and transaction costs ~Lehmann ~1990!!.
4 As we show later, industry adjustments account for approximately 20 percent of the price
momentum effect in our sample but have no effect on the predictive power of volume.
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ments, because it is motivated by market microstructure concerns raised in
Campbell et al. ~1993!. Our interest lies in the prediction of cross-sectional
returns over longer ~three-month and longer! horizons. In the intermediate
time horizon, the empirical puzzle is not return reversal but return contin-
uation. Given the longer time horizons, these price continuations are un-
likely to be due to the short-term liquidity shocks. In fact, we deliberately
form our portfolios with a one-week ~or a one-month! lag to minimize the
effect of bid-ask bounce and short-horizon return reversals.
In a related study, Datar et al. ~1998! show that low turnover stocks gen-
erally earn higher returns than high turnover stocks. They interpret this
result as providing support for the liquidity hypothesis of Amihud and Men-
delson ~1986!.6 According to the liquidity hypothesis, firms with relatively
low trading volume are less liquid and therefore command a higher expected
return. We build on the finding of Datar et al. ~1998! by examining the
interaction between past price momentum and trading volume in predicting
cross-sectional returns. We confirm their findings but also present addi-
tional evidence, which is difficult to reconcile with the liquidity hypothesis.
In sum, prior studies have documented a striking pattern of price momen-
tum in the intermediate horizon. Other studies have examined the relation be-
tween trading volume and future returns. We integrate these two lines of
research and report the joint distribution of future returns conditional on both
past trading volume and past returns. More importantly, as we show later, our
results provide a bridge between past studies on market over- and underreac-
tion, in addition to a link to recent theoretical studies in behavioral finance.
II. Sample and Methodology
Our sample consists of all firms listed on the NYSE and AMEX during the
period January 1965 through December 1995 with at least two years of data
prior to the portfolio formation date. We exclude Nasdaq firms from our
analysis for two reasons. First, Nasdaq firms tend to be smaller and more
difficult to trade in momentum-based strategies. Second, trading volume for
Nasdaq stocks is inflated relative to NYSE and AMEX stocks due to the
double counting of dealer trades ~Gould and Kleidon ~1994!!. Because we
rank our firms by average turnover, mixing Nasdaq and NYSE firms will
result in inconsistent treatment of firms across these different markets.7
5 Along the same lines, Chordia and Swaminathan ~1999! find that at short horizons low
volume stocks exhibit more underreaction than high volume stocks.
6 In a similar study, Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam ~1998! use dollar-trading vol-
ume as a proxy of liquidity and find similar results.
7 We have also replicated our results using a holdout sample consisting of just Nasdaq-NMS
firms from 1983 to 1996. The predictive power of trading volume is even stronger among Nasdaq-
NMS firms. However, we suspect illiquidity problems are more pervasive with the Nasdaq-NMS
sample.
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investment trust ~REIT!, an American Depository Receipt ~ADR!,o raf o r -
eign company. We also eliminate firms that were delisted within five days of
the portfolio formation date and firms whose stock price as of the portfolio
formation date was less than a dollar. Finally, to be included in our sample
a stock must also have available information on past returns, trading vol-
ume, market capitalization, and stock price. Trading volume ~Volume! is de-
fined as the average daily turnover in percentage during the portfolio formation
period, where daily turnover is the ratio of the number of shares traded each
day to the number of shares outstanding at the end of the day.8 Descriptive
statistics that require accounting data ~e.g., the B0M ratio and the return-
on-equity! are based on the subset of firms in each portfolio that also are in
the COMPUSTAT database. Tests involving long-term earnings forecasts or
number of analysts are based on firms that are in the I0B0E0S database.
At the beginning of each month, from January 1965 to December 1995, we
rank all eligible stocks independently on the basis of past returns and past
trading volume. The stocks are then assigned to one of 10 portfolios based
on returns over the previous J months and one of three portfolios based on
the trading volume over the same time period.9 The intersections resulting
from the two independent rankings give rise to 30 price momentum–volume
portfolios. We focus our attention on the monthly returns of extreme winner
and loser deciles over the next K months ~K 5 3, 6, 9, or 12! and over the
next five years.
Similar to Jegadeesh and Titman ~1993!, the monthly return for a K-month
holding period is based on an equal-weighted average of portfolio returns
from strategies implemented in the current month and the previous K 2 1
months. For example, the monthly return for a three-month holding period
is based on an equal-weighted average of portfolio returns from this month’s
strategy, last month’s strategy, and the strategy from two months ago. This
is equivalent to revising the weights of ~approximately! one-third of the port-
folio each month and carrying over the rest from the previous month. The
technique allows us to use simple t-statistics for monthly returns. To avoid
potential microstructure biases, we impose a one-week lag between the end
of the portfolio formation period ~J! and the beginning of the performance
measurement period ~K!.10
III. Results for Volume-Based Price Momentum Strategies
In this section, we discuss the empirical results for volume-based price
momentum strategies. In Subsection A, we confirm the price momentum
strategy for our sample of firms. We also ensure that our results are con-
8 Most previous studies have used turnover as a measure of the trading volume in a stock
~see Campbell et al. ~1993!!. Note also that raw trading volume is unscaled and, therefore, is
likely to be highly correlated with firm size.
9 We have also formed intersections with five momentum and five volume portfolios and
three momentum and 10 volume portfolios. These results are presented in Table III.
10 We have also replicated our tests with a one-month lag and found similar results.
2022 The Journal of Financesistent with the stylized facts from prior volume studies. In Subsection B,
we introduce volume-based price momentum portfolios and examine their
predictive power for cross-sectional returns over intermediate horizons. In
Subsection C, we provide results of robustness checks for volume-based price
momentum strategies. In Subsection D, we provide results from Fama–
French three-factor regressions. In Subsection E, we examine long-horizon
~one- to five-year! returns to various volume-based price momentum portfo-
lios. Finally in Subsection F, we provide evidence on the usefulness of trad-
ing volume in predicting the timing of price momentum reversals.
A. Price Momentum
Table I summarizes results from several price momentum portfolio strat-
egies. Each January, stocks are ranked and grouped into decile portfolios on
the basis of their returns over the previous three, six, nine, and 12 months.
We report results for the bottom decile portfolio of extreme losers ~R1!, the
top decile of extreme winners ~R10!, and one intermediate portfolio ~R5!.
The other intermediate portfolio results are consistent with findings in prior
papers ~Jegadeesh and Titman ~1993!! and are omitted for simplicity of
presentation.
For each portfolio, Table I reports the mean return volume during the
portfolio formation period, the time-series average of the median size decile
of the portfolio based on NYSE0AMEX cutoffs ~SzRnk!, and the time-series
average of the median stock price ~Price! as of portfolio formation date. At
the portfolio formation date, stocks in the winner portfolio are typically larger
~column 5! and have higher price ~column 6! than stocks in the loser port-
folio. This is not surprising given the difference in recent returns. For ex-
ample, for the six-month formation period ~J 5 6!, losers lost an average of
6.36 percent per month over the past six months, whereas winners gained
8.30 percent per month ~Column 3!.
The results in Columns 3 and 4 confirm stylized facts about price move-
ments and trading volume observed in prior studies. As expected, trading
volume is positively correlated with absolute returns, so that the extreme
price momentum portfolios exhibit higher trading volume. For example, the
average daily turnover for the R1 and R10 portfolios in the six-month port-
folio formation period is 0.17 percent and 0.23 percent, respectively, com-
pared to 0.12 percent for the intermediate ~R5! portfolio. In addition, we find
that the positive relation between absolute returns and trading volume is
asymmetric, in that extreme winners have a higher trading volume than
extreme losers ~see Lakonishok and Smidt ~1986!!.
Columns 7 through 10 report equal-weighted average monthly returns over
the next K months ~K 5 3, 6, 9, 12!. In addition, for each portfolio formation
period ~J! and holding period ~K!, we report the mean return from a dollar-
neutral strategy of buying the extreme winners and selling the extreme los-
ers ~R10 2 R1!. These results confirm the presence of price momentum in
our sample. For example, with a six-month portfolio formation period ~J 5 6!,
past winners gain an average of 1.65 percent per month over the next nine
Price Momentum and Trading Volume 2023Table I
Returns to Price Momentum Portfolios
This table presents average monthly and annual returns in percentages for price momentum portfolio strategies involving
NYSE0AMEX stocks for the time period from 1965 to 1995. At the beginning of each month starting in January 1965, all stocks
in the NYSE and AMEX are sorted based on their previous J months’ returns and divided into 10 equal-weighted portfolios. R1
represents the loser portfolio with the lowest returns, and R10 represents the winner portfolio with the highest returns during
the previous J months. K represents monthly holding periods where K 5 three, six, nine, or 12 months. Monthly holding period
returns are computed as an equal-weighted average of returns from strategies initiated at the beginning of this month and past
months. The annual returns ~Year 1, Year 2, Year 3, Year 4, and Year 5! are computed as event time returns for five 12-month
periods following the portfolio formation date. Return refers to the geometric average monthly return in percentages, and Volume
represents the average daily turnover in percentages, both measured over the portfolio formation period, J. SzRnk represents the
time-series average of the median size decile of the portfolio ~based on NYSE0AMEX stocks in the sample! on the portfolio
formation date. Price represents the time-series average of the median stock price of the portfolio in dollars on the portfolio
formation date. The numbers in parentheses represent t-statistics. The t-statistics for monthly return ~K 5 three, six nine, or 12!
are simple t-statistics, whereas those for annual returns are based on the Hansen–Hodrick ~1980! correction for autocorrelation
up to lag 11.
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J Portfolio Return Volume SzRnk Price K 5 3 K 5 6 K 5 9 K 5 12 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
3R 1 2 8.91 0.1604 3.68 9.91 0.76 0.73 0.77 0.74 8.95 15.86 15.27 14.81 15.82
~1.88!~ 1.81!~ 1.93!~ 1.86!~ 1.91!~ 3.46!~ 3.40!~ 3.53!~ 4.13!
R5 0.08 0.1185 6.09 20.96 1.37 1.36 1.33 1.30 17.11 16.90 15.54 15.19 15.89
~4.84!~ 4.76!~ 4.65!~ 4.55!~ 4.74!~ 4.87!~ 4.51!~ 4.59!~ 5.01!
R10 12.00 0.2403 4.82 17.45 1.42 1.40 1.47 1.46 19.57 15.03 15.51 13.22 13.35
~4.28!~ 4.16!~ 4.33!~ 4.24!~ 4.28!~ 3.37!~ 3.93!~ 3.52!~ 3.30!
R10 2 R1 0.66 0.67 0.70 0.72 10.62 20.84 0.24 21.59 22.46
~3.06!~ 3.38!~ 3.93!~ 4.59!~ 5.77!~ 2 0.69!~ 0.15!~ 2 1.27!~ 2 2.57!
6R 1 2 6.36 0.1671 3.56 9.00 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.65 7.92 15.91 15.46 15.57 15.96
~1.39!~ 1.38!~ 1.40!~ 1.58!~ 1.60!~ 3.35!~ 3.27!~ 3.54!~ 4.25!
R5 0.25 0.1212 6.13 20.79 1.31 1.29 1.31 1.30 16.95 16.98 15.65 14.82 15.50
~4.66!~ 4.55!~ 4.59!~ 4.52!~ 4.73!~ 4.96!~ 4.49!~ 4.46!~ 4.91!
R10 8.30 0.2349 5.05 19.41 1.62 1.62 1.65 1.53 20.41 14.81 15.15 12.81 13.00
~4.76!~ 4.72!~ 4.78!~ 4.45!~ 4.54!~ 3.27!~ 3.97!~ 3.41!~ 3.14!
R10 2 R1 1.04 1.05 1.08 0.88 12.49 21.10 20.32 22.77 22.96
~3.89!~ 4.28!~ 4.92!~ 4.18!~ 5.04!~ 2 0.66!~ 2 0.15!~ 2 1.68!~ 2 2.46!
9R 1 2 5.27 0.1713 3.34 8.34 0.49 0.44 0.55 0.66 7.89 15.91 15.76 16.02 15.77
~1.15!~ 1.06!~ 1.32!~ 1.57!~ 1.57!~ 3.26!~ 3.18!~ 3.56!~ 4.19!
R5 0.31 0.1230 6.12 20.87 1.28 1.28 1.30 1.30 16.81 16.96 16.16 15.32 15.77
~4.48!~ 4.46!~ 4.56!~ 4.52!~ 4.72!~ 4.82!~ 4.59!~ 4.67!~ 4.95!
R10 6.78 0.2304 5.14 20.59 1.85 1.79 1.71 1.54 20.59 14.97 14.88 12.16 12.52
~5.31!~ 5.08!~ 4.86!~ 4.41!~ 4.54!~ 3.28!~ 3.98!~ 3.18!~ 3.04!
R10 2 R1 1.36 1.35 1.15 0.88 12.70 20.95 20.88 23.86 23.26
~4.85!~ 5.29!~ 4.71!~ 3.72!~ 5.10!~ 2 0.46!~ 2 0.35!~ 2 2.12!~ 2 2.45!
12 R1 24.61 0.1727 3.28 7.78 0.34 0.45 0.60 0.72 8.14 15.63 16.15 16.23 15.99
~0.80!~ 1.05!~ 1.41!~ 1.66!~ 1.63!~ 3.11!~ 3.18!~ 3.59!~ 4.20!
R5 0.37 0.1239 6.13 20.83 1.24 1.28 1.32 1.31 17.06 17.34 15.83 15.43 15.90
~4.34!~ 4.51!~ 4.63!~ 4.56!~ 4.83!~ 4.97!~ 4.65!~ 4.74!~ 4.96!
R10 5.96 0.2300 5.27 21.79 1.88 1.71 1.61 1.46 19.70 14.93 14.18 11.70 12.24
~5.29!~ 4.84!~ 4.59!~ 4.15!~ 4.37!~ 3.26!~ 3.82!~ 3.02!~ 2.99!
R10 2 R1 1.54 1.26 1.01 0.74 11.56 20.70 21.96 24.54 23.75
~5.63!~ 4.71!~ 3.87!~ 2.93!~ 5.08!~ 2 0.29!~ 2 0.70!~ 2 2.44!~ 2 2.47!
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5months ~K 5 9!. Past losers gain an average of only 0.57 percent per month
over the same time period. The difference between R10 and R1 is 1.08 per-
cent per month. The difference in average monthly returns between R10 and
R1 is significantly positive in all ~J,K! combinations.
The last five columns of Table I report the annual event-time returns for
each portfolio for five 12-month periods following the portfolio formation
date, with t-statistics based on the Hansen and Hodrick ~1980! correction for
autocorrelation up to lag 11. In Year 1, the R10 2 1 portfolio yields a sta-
tistically significant return of between 10.62 percent and 12.70 percent per
year. Consistent with Jegadeesh and Titman ~1993!, we observe a modest
reversal to momentum profits in Years 2 and 3. As in their study, we find
that the negative returns in these two years are not statistically significant
and are not sufficient to explain the initial momentum gains in Year 1.
When we extend the event time to Years 4 and 5, a pattern of price re-
versal begins to emerge. The last two columns show that R10 2 R1 returns
are negative in Years 4 and 5 for all formation periods. The reversal pattern
becomes stronger monotonically as the formation period ~J! increases. For
the longest formation period ~J 5 12!, the sum of the losses in Years 2 through
5 ~10.95 percent! almost offsets the entire gain from Year 1 ~11.56 percent!.
This reversal pattern is not documented in prior studies that limit return
prediction to Year 3.
In sum, Table I confirms prior findings on price momentum. It also ex-
tends prior results by documenting significant long-term price reversals in
Years 4 and 5. Our results show intermediate-horizon price momentum ef-
fects do eventually reverse. Moreover, the longer the estimation period for
past returns, the more imminent the future price reversals. We will expand
on this theme later when we introduce autocorrelation evidence based on
regression tests ~see Table VIII!.
B. Volume-Based Price Momentum
Table II reports returns to portfolios formed on the basis of a two-way sort
between price momentum and past trading volume. To create this table, we
sort all sample firms at the beginning of each month based on their returns
over the past J months and divide them into 10 portfolios ~R1 to R10!.W e
then independently sort these same firms based on their average daily turn-
over rate over the past J months and divide them into three volume port-
folios ~V1 to V3!. V1 represents the lowest trading volume portfolio, and V3
represents the highest trading volume portfolio. Table values represent the
average monthly return over the next K months ~K 5 3, 6, 9, 12!.
Several key results emerge from Table II. First, conditional on past re-
turns, low volume stocks generally do better than high volume stocks over
the next 12 months. This is seen in the consistently negative returns to the
V3 2 V1 portfolio. For example, with a nine-month portfolio formation pe-
riod and six month holding period ~J 5 9, K 5 6!, low volume losers outper-
form high volume losers by 1.02 percent per month, whereas low volume
2026 The Journal of Financewinners outperform high volume winners by 0.26 percent per month. We
find similar results in almost every ~J,K! cell. Apparently firms that expe-
rience low trading volume in the recent past tend to outperform firms that
experience high trading volume.
The finding that low volume firms earn higher expected returns is con-
sistent with Datar et al. ~1998!. In that paper, this finding is interpreted as
evidence that low volume firms command a greater illiquidity premium. How-
ever, Table II also contains evidence that is difficult to explain by the liquid-
ity explanation. The bottom row of each cell in this table shows the return to
a dollar-neutral price momentum strategy ~R10 2 R1!. Focusing on this row,
it is clear that R10 2 R1 returns are higher for high volume ~V3! firms than
for low volume ~V1! firms. For example, for J 5 6 and K 5 6, the price
momentum spread is 1.46 percent for high volume firms and only 0.54 per-
cent for low volume firms. The difference of 0.91 percent per month is both
economically and statistically significant. The other cells illustrate qualita-
tively the same effect. The price momentum premium is clearly higher in
high volume ~presumably more liquid! firms.
According to the liquidity hypothesis, the portfolio with lower liquidity
should earn higher expected returns. It is difficult to understand why a
dollar-neutral portfolio of high turnover stocks should be less liquid than a
dollar-neutral portfolio of low turnover stocks. Moreover, the magnitude of
the difference is too large to be explained by illiquidity. For example, for
J 5 6, K 5 6, the difference in momentum premium between V3 and V1 is
0.91 percent per month, or approximately 11 percent annualized. For the
liquidity hypothesis to hold, high volume winners would have to be much
more illiquid than are high volume losers.
A closer examination shows that this counterintuitive result is driven pri-
marily by the return differential in the loser portfolio ~R1!. Low volume
losers ~R1V1! rebound strongly in the next 12 months relative to high volume
losers, averaging more than one percent per month in virtually all ~J,K!
combinations. In contrast, high volume losers ~R1V3! earn an average return
of between 20.21 percent and 10.41 percent per month. The return differen-
tial between high and low volume winners is not nearly as large. In most cells
the difference in returns between low volume winners and high volume win-
ners is small and statistically insignificant.11 Nevertheless, high volume win-
ners generally underperform low volume winners, so buying high volume
winners does not enhance the performance of the price momentum strategy.
In sum, Table II shows that over the next 12 months, price momentum is
more pronounced among high volume stocks. In addition, we find that con-
trolling for price momentum, low volume stocks generally outperform high
volume stocks. This effect is most pronounced among losers in the intermedi-
ate horizon.
11 As we show later, this result is specific to the first year after portfolio formation. Table VI
reports that low volume winners outperform high volume winners by two percent to six percent
per year beyond Year 1.
Price Momentum and Trading Volume 2027Table II
Monthly Returns for Portfolios Based on Price Momentum and Trading Volume
This table presents average monthly returns from portfolio strategies based on an independent two-way based on past returns
and past average daily turnover for the 1965 to 1995 time period. At the beginning of each month all available stocks in the
NYSE0AMEX are sorted independently based on past J month returns and divided into 10 portfolios. K represents monthly
holding periods where K 5 three, six, nine, or 12 months. R1 represents the loser portfolio, and R10 represents the winner
portfolio. The stocks are then independently sorted based on the average daily volume over the past J months and divided into
three portfolios, where we use turnover as a proxy of trading volume. V1 represents the lowest trading volume portfolio, and V3
represents the highest trading volume portfolio. The stocks at the intersection of the two sorts are grouped together to form
portfolios based on past returns and past trading volume. Monthly returns are computed based on the portfolio rebalancing
strategy described in Table I. The numbers in parentheses are simple t-statistics.
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J Portfolio V1 V2 V3 V3 2 V1 V1 V2 V3 V3 2 V1 V1 V2 V3 V3 2 V1 V1 V2 V3 V3 2 V1
3 R1 1.24 0.96 0.19 21.05 1.19 0.87 0.25 20.93 1.21 0.89 0.34 20.86 1.17 0.81 0.36 20.81
~3.17!~ 2.32!~ 0.44!~ 2 5.11!~ 3.06!~ 2.16!~ 0.59!~ 2 5.14!~ 3.12!~ 2.24!~ 0.81!~ 2 5.02!~ 3.06!~ 2.06!~ 0.85!~ 2 4.98!
R5 1.41 1.45 1.20 20.20 1.42 1.38 1.23 20.19 1.40 1.34 1.19 20.21 1.40 1.31 1.14 20.26
~5.62!~ 5.02!~ 3.40!~ 2 1.28!~ 5.62!~ 4.77!~ 3.48!~ 2 1.20!~ 5.54!~ 4.62!~ 3.38!~ 2 1.38!~ 5.54!~ 4.50!~ 3.23!~ 2 1.72!
R10 1.25 1.61 1.45 0.20 1.43 1.59 1.36 20.07 1.54 1.65 1.41 20.13 1.59 1.65 1.37 20.23
~4.12!~ 4.93!~ 4.05!~ 1.09!~ 4.68!~ 4.87!~ 3.77!~ 2 0.45!~ 4.97!~ 5.05!~ 3.87!~ 2 0.80!~ 5.03!~ 5.02!~ 3.71!~ 2 1.38!
R10 2 R1 0.01 0.66 1.26 1.26 0.25 0.73 1.11 0.86 0.33 0.76 1.06 0.73 0.43 0.85 1.01 0.58
~0.03!~ 2.78!~ 5.69!~ 6.09!~ 1.25!~ 3.56!~ 5.42!~ 5.71!~ 1.83!~ 4.10!~ 5.88!~ 5.52!~ 2.57!~ 5.24!~ 6.20!~ 5.07!
6 R1 1.16 0.77 0.03 21.14 1.12 0.67 0.09 21.04 1.03 0.67 0.16 20.88 1.09 0.74 0.30 20.79
~2.80!~ 1.82!~ 0.06!~ 2 5.22!~ 2.74!~ 1.61!~ 0.20!~ 2 5.19!~ 2.58!~ 1.66!~ 0.36!~ 2 4.82!~ 2.70!~ 1.82!~ 0.67!~ 2 4.54!
R5 1.37 1.34 1.19 20.18 1.36 1.34 1.15 20.21 1.38 1.35 1.16 20.22 1.39 1.32 1.13 20.26
~5.50!~ 4.64!~ 3.39!~ 2 1.10!~ 5.37!~ 4.63!~ 3.28!~ 2 1.33!~ 5.44!~ 4.65!~ 3.32!~ 2 1.41!~ 5.44!~ 4.53!~ 3.19!~ 2 1.72!
R10 1.63 1.82 1.57 20.06 1.67 1.78 1.55 20.12 1.72 1.85 1.56 20.16 1.66 1.75 1.42 20.23
~5.12!~ 5.55!~ 4.28!~ 2 0.31!~ 5.30!~ 5.41!~ 4.16!~ 2 0.67!~ 5.52!~ 5.59!~ 4.18!~ 2 0.89!~ 5.35!~ 5.34!~ 3.82!~ 2 1.34!
R10 2 R1 0.47 1.05 1.55 1.07 0.54 1.11 1.46 0.91 0.69 1.17 1.41 0.71 0.57 1.00 1.13 0.56
~1.64!~ 3.79!~ 5.78!~ 4.68!~ 2.07!~ 4.46!~ 5.93!~ 4.61!~ 2.93!~ 5.28!~ 6.28!~ 4.18!~ 2.59!~ 4.72!~ 5.20!~ 3.60!
9 R1 1.16 0.65 20.14 21.30 0.99 0.54 20.04 21.02 1.01 0.69 0.15 20.86 1.09 0.77 0.32 20.77
~2.68!~ 1.51!~ 2 0.31!~ 2 5.87!~ 2.35!~ 1.31!~ 2 0.08!~ 2 5.06!~ 2.42!~ 1.66!~ 0.34!~ 2 4.50!~ 2.59!~ 1.82!~ 0.71!~ 2 4.13!
R5 1.39 1.33 1.04 20.35 1.37 1.31 1.09 20.28 1.40 1.33 1.13 20.27 1.41 1.31 1.10 20.31
~5.44!~ 4.63!~ 2.89!~ 2 2.10!~ 5.41!~ 4.55!~ 3.04!~ 2 1.77!~ 5.53!~ 4.61!~ 3.16!~ 2 1.75!~ 5.56!~ 4.52!~ 3.08!~ 2 2.01!
R10 1.91 2.09 1.73 20.17 1.92 2.00 1.67 20.26 1.86 1.94 1.57 20.29 1.75 1.79 1.39 20.35
~5.81!~ 6.20!~ 4.59!~ 2 0.85!~ 5.85!~ 5.89!~ 4.36!~ 2 1.31!~ 5.78!~ 5.80!~ 4.11!~ 2 1.54!~ 5.50!~ 5.40!~ 3.65!~ 2 1.96!
R10 2 R1 0.74 1.44 1.87 1.13 0.94 1.46 1.70 0.77 0.85 1.25 1.42 0.57 0.66 1.02 1.07 0.41
~2.31!~ 4.87!~ 6.75!~ 4.72!~ 3.20!~ 5.57!~ 6.62!~ 3.49!~ 3.11!~ 4.95!~ 5.72!~ 2.90!~ 2.54!~ 4.18!~ 4.46!~ 2.24!
12 R1 0.92 0.47 20.21 21.13 0.95 0.58 0.00 20.94 1.04 0.73 0.24 20.80 1.10 0.81 0.41 20.69
~2.20!~ 1.13!~ 2 0.46!~ 2 5.20!~ 2.25!~ 1.37!~ 0.01!~ 2 4.61!~ 2.44!~ 1.69!~ 0.53!~ 2 4.03!~ 2.59!~ 1.88!~ 0.90!~ 2 3.56!
R5 1.28 1.33 1.07 20.21 1.36 1.35 1.10 20.26 1.40 1.38 1.12 20.29 1.43 1.34 1.08 20.35
~5.09!~ 4.56!~ 3.03!~ 2 1.28!~ 5.38!~ 4.68!~ 3.10!~ 2 1.58!~ 5.57!~ 4.77!~ 3.15!~ 2 1.84!~ 5.62!~ 4.61!~ 3.04!~ 2 2.30!
R10 1.94 2.09 1.74 20.20 1.91 1.89 1.57 20.33 1.82 1.84 1.45 20.37 1.71 1.67 1.31 20.40
~5.81!~ 6.07!~ 4.53!~ 2 0.95!~ 5.82!~ 5.61!~ 4.08!~ 2 1.71!~ 5.66!~ 5.53!~ 3.78!~ 2 1.92!~ 5.37!~ 5.04!~ 3.39!~ 2 2.16!
R10 2 R1 1.02 1.62 1.95 0.92 0.96 1.31 1.57 0.61 0.78 1.11 1.21 0.43 0.60 0.86 0.90 0.29
~3.33!~ 5.58!~ 7.10!~ 3.82!~ 3.24!~ 4.63!~ 5.83!~ 2.74!~ 2.73!~ 4.06!~ 4.64!~ 2.06!~ 2.17!~ 3.21!~ 3.52!~ 1.47!
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9C. Robustness Tests
Table III presents various robustness checks on these basic intermediate-
horizon results. Panel A confirms these patterns for three subperiods. The
first subperiod spans 1965 to 1975, the second subperiod covers 1976 to
1985, and the last subperiod covers 1986 to 1995. We report results for the
six-month formation period ~J 5 6!, but results are similar for other forma-
tion periods. In all three subperiods, winners outperform losers, low volume
stocks outperform high volume stocks, and momentum is stronger among
high volume stocks. In fact, the result is strongest in the more recent subperiod.
Our earlier results are based on 10 price momentum portfolios and three
trading volume portfolios ~10 3 3!. Table III shows that our results are not
specific to this partitioning. Panel B reports results using three price mo-
mentum portfolios and 10 trading volume portfolios ~3 3 10!, whereas Panel
C reports results using five price momentum and five volume portfolios ~535!.
Generally, the volume-based results are as strong as or stronger than those
reported in Table II. In fact, in these partitions, low volume winners gener-
ally outperform high volume winners by a wider margin than was evident in
Table II.
To ensure that these results are not driven by a few small stocks, Panel D
of Table III reports the volume-based price momentum results using only
the largest 50 percent of all NYSE0AMEX stocks. Not surprisingly, both the
momentum and volume effects are weaker for this restricted sample. How-
ever, the volume-based results continue to obtain. For example, for J 5 6,
K 5 6, the momentum spread is 0.95 percent for high volume firms and only
0.24 percent for low volume firms. This effect is again driven by low volume
losers that gain 1.09 percent per month, as compared to high volume losers
that gain only 0.44 percent per month.12
D. Risk Adjustments
Table IV reports descriptive characteristics for various price momentum
and volume portfolios. Looking down each column, we see that losers are
generally smaller firms with lower stock prices. This is not surprising given
the losses they recently sustained. Looking across each row, we see that high
and low volume portfolios do not differ significantly in terms of their median
stock price or firm size. High volume firms tend to be somewhat larger and
more highly priced, but the difference is not large. For example, Panel A
shows that high volume losers ~R1V3! have a median price of $10.64 while
low volume losers have a median price of $7.65. In later tests, we provide
more formal controls for firm size and industry differences.
12 We have also replicated the results in Table II using value-weighted portfolio returns. We
obtain similar but ~not surprisingly! slightly weaker results. For instance, for the ~J 5 6, K 5 6!
strategy, the R10 2 R1 returns for low, medium, and high volume portfolios are 0.35 percent,
1.04 percent, and 1.15 percent per month, respectively. The difference in R10 2 R1 between
high and low volume is 0.80 percent, which is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
2030 The Journal of FinanceTable V provides additional evidence on the source of abnormal returns for
the various volume-based price momentum strategies. In this table, we re-
port the results from time-series regressions based on the Fama–French
~1993! three-factor model.13 Specifically, we run the following time-series
regression using monthly portfolio returns:
~ri 2 rf ! 5 ai 1 bi~rm 2 rf! 1 si SMB 1 hi HML 1 ei, ~1!
where ri is the monthly return for portfolio i; rf is the monthly return on
one-month T-bill obtained from the Ibbotson Associates’ Stocks, Bonds, Bills,
Inflation ~SBBI! series; rm is the value-weighted return on the NYSE0AMEX0
Nasdaq market index; SMB is the Fama–French small firm factor; HML is
the Fama–French book-to-market ~value! factor; bi, si, hi are the correspond-
ing factor loadings; and ai is the intercept or the alpha of the portfolio.14 For
parsimony, we report results for symmetrical combinations of portfolio for-
mation and holding periods ~J and K 5 six and 12 months!. The first cell on
the left in each panel reports the estimated intercept coefficient; the sub-
sequent cells report estimated coefficients for bi, si, and hi, respectively. The
last cell of each panel reports the adjusted R
2.
The estimated intercept coefficients from these regressions ~ai! are inter-
pretable as the risk-adjusted return of the portfolio relative to the three-
factor model. Focusing on these intercepts, it is clear that our earlier results
cannot be explained by the Fama–French factors. The intercepts correspond-
ing to R10 2 R1 are positive across all three volume categories. The return
differential between winners and losers remains much higher for high vol-
ume ~V3! firms than for low volume ~V1! firms. Finally, a strategy of buying
low volume winners and selling high volume losers yields average abnormal
returns of between one percent and two percent per month in both panels.
Even more revealing are the estimated factor loadings on the SMB and
HML factors. First focus on the estimated coefficients for the HML factor
~hi! in the six-month horizon. Here we see that low volume stocks ~V1 port-
folios! have a much more positive loading on the HML factor. This applies to
winners ~R10!, losers ~R1!, and even the intermediate portfolio ~R5!. Appar-
ently low volume stocks behave more like value stocks, that is, stocks with
high book-to-market ratios. High volume stocks, on the other hand, behave
more like glamour stocks, that is, stocks with low book-to-market ratios. In
fact, high volume winners ~R10V3! tend to have negative loadings on the
HML factor.
13 We have also performed characteristics-based risk adjustment and computed size-
adjusted, industry-adjusted, and size- and book-to-market-adjusted returns to check the robust-
ness of results in Table II. These results confirm the basic findings. We do not report these to
conserve space.
14 SMB is small firm return minus large firm return and HML is high book-to-market port-
folio return minus low book-to-market portfolio return. For details on portfolio construction, see
Fama and French ~1993!.
Price Momentum and Trading Volume 2031Table III
Returns on Portfolios Based on Price Momentum and Trading Volume: Robustness Tests
This table presents subsample period results, results for strategies using only the largest 50% of NYSE0AMEX stocks, and results for two-way
sorts involving five price momentum and five trading volume portfolios and three price momentum and 10 trading volume portfolios. We present
all these results only for the six-month portfolio formation period ~J 5 6!. For subsample tests we form 10 price momentum and three trading
volume portfolios. For strategies involving the largest 50% of NYSE0AMEX stocks, we form five price momentum and five trading volume
portfolios. Note that we use turnover as a proxy of trading volum. K represents monthly holding periods where K 5 three, six, nine or 12 months.
RI represents the loser portfolio. R10 ~R5! represents the winner portfolio when we form 10 ~five! price momentum portfolios. V1 represents the
lowest trading volume portfolio. V3 ~V5! represents the highest trading volume portfolio when we form three ~five! volume portfolios. The
portfolios are rebalanced each month as described in Table I. The numbers in parentheses are simple t-statistics.
Panel A: Subsample Results
K 5 3 K 5 6 K 5 9 K 5 12
Portfolio V1 V2 V3 V3 2 V1 V1 V2 V3 V3 2 V1 V1 V2 V3 V3 2 V1 V1 V2 V3 V3 2 V1
Sample period: 1965–1975
R1 0.83 0.82 20.19 21.03 1.00 0.75 20.07 21.07 0.93 0.78 20.01 20.94 0.80 0.76 0.00 20.81
~1.00!~ 0.92!~ 2 0.21!~ 2 2.81!~ 1.21!~ 0.86!~ 2 0.08!~ 2 3.07!~ 1.15!~ 0.90!~ 2 0.01!~ 2 2.76!~ 0.98!~ 0.87!~ 2 0.01!~ 2 2.39!
R5 0.83 0.79 0.57 20.26 0.80 0.86 0.54 20.25 0.84 0.93 0.58 20.25 0.83 0.87 0.50 20.33
~1.70!~ 1.32!~ 0.79!~ 2 0.75!~ 1.59!~ 1.42!~ 0.75!~ 2 0.73!~ 1.65!~ 1.50!~ 0.79!~ 2 0.73!~ 1.61!~ 1.39!~ 0.66!~ 2 0.94!
R10 1.27 1.48 1.07 20.20 1.09 1.38 0.97 20.13 1.11 1.43 1.01 20.10 0.98 1.29 0.78 20.20
~2.37!~ 2.57!~ 1.55!~ 2 0.46!~ 2.07!~ 2.34!~ 1.37!~ 2 0.34!~ 2.11!~ 2.39!~ 1.40!~ 2 0.25!~ 1.82!~ 2.09!~ 1.07!~ 2 0.53!
R10 2 R1 0.43 0.66 1.26 0.83 0.09 0.62 1.04 0.95 0.17 0.66 1.02 0.85 0.18 0.53 0.79 0.61
~0.71!~ 1.07!~ 2.18!~ 1.86!~ 0.17!~ 1.11!~ 1.96!~ 2.45!~ 0.34!~ 1.31!~ 2.15!~ 2.44!~ 0.38!~ 1.10!~ 1.75!~ 1.94!
Sample period: 1976–1985
R1 2.17 1.40 0.87 21.29 1.95 1.29 0.83 21.12 1.84 1.22 0.86 20.98 1.97 1.34 1.06 20.91
~3.36!~ 2.13!~ 1.31!~ 2 3.43!~ 3.13!~ 2.02!~ 1.27!~ 2 3.15!~ 3.05!~ 1.97!~ 1.33!~ 2 3.15!~ 3.24!~ 2.16!~ 1.63!~ 2 3.11!
R5 2.10 1.93 1.96 20.14 2.16 1.90 1.87 20.29 2.14 1.91 1.88 20.27 2.17 1.91 1.89 20.28
~5.14!~ 4.23!~ 3.40!~ 2 0.53!~ 5.19!~ 4.20!~ 3.30!~ 2 1.15!~ 5.14!~ 4.23!~ 3.36!~ 2 1.12!~ 5.17!~ 4.27!~ 3.40!~ 2 1.23!
R10 2.45 2.64 2.31 20.14 2.63 2.60 2.30 20.33 2.66 2.59 2.27 20.38 2.59 2.47 2.18 20.41
~3.86!~ 4.29!~ 3.55!~ 2 0.47!~ 4.21!~ 4.23!~ 3.52!~ 2 1.18!~ 4.28!~ 4.25!~ 3.49!~ 2 1.36!~ 4.31!~ 4.14!~ 3.37!~ 2 1.55!
R10 2 R1 0.29 1.23 1.44 1.15 0.68 1.31 1.46 0.79 0.82 1.38 1.41 0.60 0.62 1.13 1.12 0.50
~0.68!~ 3.17!~ 4.12!~ 3.37!~ 1.80!~ 3.86!~ 4.73!~ 2.80!~ 2.53!~ 4.49!~ 4.93!~ 2.67!~ 2.13!~ 4.01!~ 4.04!~ 2.52!
Sample period: 1985–1995
R1 0.51 0.09 20.59 21.10 0.43 20.04 20.48 20.91 0.33 0.02 20.38 20.70 0.49 0.14 20.16 20.65
~0.81!~ 0.16!~ 2 0.88!~ 2 2.83!~ 0.67!~ 2 0.07!~ 2 0.72!~ 2 2.77!~ 0.51!~ 0.04!~ 2 0.57!~ 2 2.44!~ 0.77!~ 0.23!~ 2 0.24!~ 2 2.43!
R5 1.23 1.35 1.10 20.14 1.15 1.29 1.06 20.09 1.18 1.23 1.05 20.13 1.17 1.18 0.99 20.17
~3.33!~ 3.38!~ 2.29!~ 2 0.64!~ 3.12!~ 3.17!~ 2.22!~ 2 0.46!~ 3.22!~ 3.07!~ 2.21!~ 2 0.72!~ 3.18!~ 2.90!~ 2.09!~ 2 0.94!
R10 1.21 1.37 1.37 0.16 1.32 1.39 1.41 0.09 1.43 1.53 1.42 0.00 1.41 1.49 1.32 20.09
~2.60!~ 2.77!~ 2.54!~ 0.58!~ 2.86!~ 2.83!~ 2.56!~ 0.33!~ 3.13!~ 3.13!~ 2.59!~ 2 0.02!~ 3.16!~ 3.17!~ 2.44!~ 2 0.37!
R10 2 R1 0.70 1.27 1.96 1.26 0.89 1.43 1.89 1.00 1.10 1.50 1.80 0.70 0.92 1.36 1.48 0.56
~1.66!~ 3.69!~ 4.85!~ 3.25!~ 2.28!~ 4.30!~ 4.87!~ 2.90!~ 2.97!~ 5.00!~ 4.85!~ 2.31!~ 2.60!~ 4.51!~ 3.96!~ 2.03!
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K 5 3 K 5 6 K 5 9 K 5 12
Portfolio V1 V5 V10 V10 2 V1 V1 V5 V10 V10 2 V1 V1 V5 V10 V10 2 V1 V1 V5 V10 V10 2 V1
R1 1.22 1.15 0.01 21.21 1.25 1.07 0.12 21.13 1.25 1.04 0.20 21.06 1.28 1.07 0.30 20.98
~3.74!~ 3.31!~ 0.01!~ 2 4.75!~ 3.83!~ 3.12!~ 0.27!~ 2 4.61!~ 3.93!~ 3.09!~ 0.45!~ 2 4.46!~ 4.02!~ 3.16!~ 0.71!~ 2 4.25!
R2 1.39 1.34 0.71 20.68 1.42 1.34 0.71 20.71 1.44 1.37 0.80 20.64 1.44 1.34 0.79 20.65
~5.79!~ 4.73!~ 1.83!~ 2 2.78!~ 5.82!~ 4.74!~ 1.83!~ 2 2.99!~ 5.88!~ 4.82!~ 2.07!~ 2 2.78!~ 5.90!~ 4.69!~ 2.03!~ 2 2.94!
R3 1.42 1.45 1.13 20.29 1.57 1.52 1.19 20.38 1.63 1.60 1.20 20.43 1.56 1.55 1.09 20.48
~5.74!~ 5.13!~ 2.98!~ 2 1.25!~ 6.21!~ 5.29!~ 3.10!~ 2 1.65!~ 6.39!~ 5.53!~ 3.11!~ 2 1.95!~ 6.16!~ 5.37!~ 2.82!~ 2 2.22!
R3 2 R1 0.20 0.30 1.13 0.92 0.32 0.46 1.08 0.75 0.38 0.56 1.00 0.63 0.28 0.48 0.78 0.50
~1.04!~ 1.65!~ 5.42!~ 4.77!~ 1.81!~ 2.77!~ 5.83!~ 4.54!~ 2.42!~ 3.89!~ 5.95!~ 4.42!~ 1.89!~ 3.48!~ 4.84!~ 3.88!
Panel C: Five Price Momentum, Five Trading Volume Portfolios
K 5 3 K 5 6 K 5 9 K 5 12
Portfolio V1 V3 V5 V5 2 V1 V1 V3 V5 V5 2 V1 V1 V3 V5 V5 2 V1 V1 V3 V5 V5 2 V1
R1 1.23 1.00 0.12 21.11 1.24 0.88 0.22 21.02 1.20 0.87 0.29 20.91 1.25 0.91 0.39 20.86
~3.32!~ 2.64!~ 0.27!~ 2 4.87!~ 3.40!~ 2.36!~ 0.51!~ 2 4.75!~ 3.38!~ 2.38!~ 0.68!~ 2 4.50!~ 3.51!~ 2.47!~ 0.92!~ 2 4.38!
R3 1.40 1.39 0.98 20.42 1.41 1.37 0.98 20.43 1.44 1.38 1.01 20.43 1.44 1.34 0.98 20.46
~5.81!~ 4.86!~ 2.67!~ 2 2.10!~ 5.71!~ 4.79!~ 2.66!~ 2 2.21!~ 5.82!~ 4.80!~ 2.75!~ 2 2.29!~ 5.83!~ 4.64!~ 2.66!~ 2 2.47!
R5 1.56 1.64 1.39 20.16 1.66 1.67 1.41 20.25 1.73 1.74 1.42 20.31 1.66 1.65 1.28 20.37
~5.73!~ 5.38!~ 3.77!~ 2 0.82!~ 6.00!~ 5.40!~ 3.78!~ 2 1.26!~ 6.15!~ 5.59!~ 3.76!~ 2 1.60!~ 5.93!~ 5.37!~ 3.41!~ 2 1.97!
R5 2 R1 0.33 0.64 1.28 0.95 0.42 0.79 1.19 0.77 0.53 0.87 1.13 0.60 0.40 0.75 0.89 0.49
~1.38!~ 2.85!~ 5.76!~ 4.86!~ 1.91!~ 3.90!~ 6.02!~ 4.59!~ 2.73!~ 4.79!~ 6.21!~ 4.19!~ 2.20!~ 4.30!~ 5.07!~ 3.66!
Panel D: Largest 50% of NYSE0AMEX Stocks ~5 3 5!
K 5 3 K 5 6 K 5 9 K 5 12
Portfolio V1 V3 V5 V5 2 V1 V1 V3 V5 V5 2 V1 V1 V3 V5 V5 2 V1 V1 V3 V5 V5 2 V1
R1 1.15 1.12 0.42 20.73 1.09 0.99 0.44 20.66 1.06 0.95 0.43 20.63 1.05 0.96 0.53 20.52
~4.11!~ 3.73!~ 1.06!~ 2 3.38!~ 4.03!~ 3.38!~ 1.11!~ 2 3.15!~ 3.99!~ 3.29!~ 1.11!~ 2 3.08!~ 3.95!~ 3.31!~ 1.35!~ 2 2.59!
R3 1.15 1.23 0.93 20.22 1.19 1.22 0.97 20.22 1.20 1.24 0.99 20.21 1.22 1.20 0.96 20.26
~5.38!~ 4.76!~ 2.67!~ 2 1.11!~ 5.50!~ 4.74!~ 2.80!~ 2 1.12!~ 5.50!~ 4.85!~ 2.85!~ 2 1.09!~ 5.60!~ 4.66!~ 2.74!~ 2 1.39!
R5 1.26 1.42 1.31 0.05 1.33 1.43 1.39 0.06 1.41 1.49 1.42 0.01 1.36 1.43 1.28 20.07
~4.98!~ 5.14!~ 3.75!~ 0.24!~ 5.24!~ 5.20!~ 3.91!~ 0.30!~ 5.49!~ 5.38!~ 3.95!~ 0.06!~ 5.33!~ 5.20!~ 3.58!~ 2 0.39!
R5 2 R1 0.11 0.30 0.89 0.78 0.24 0.44 0.95 0.71 0.34 0.54 0.98 0.64 0.31 0.47 0.76 0.45
~0.54!~ 1.59!~ 4.37!~ 3.99!~ 1.24!~ 2.75!~ 5.16!~ 4.16!~ 1.92!~ 3.63!~ 5.81!~ 4.10!~ 1.88!~ 3.42!~ 4.79!~ 3.21!
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Characteristics of Portfolios Based on Price Momentum and Trading Volume
This table presents portfolio characteristics for portfolios based on price momentum and trading volume. The way these portfolios are formed is
described in Tables II and III. The strategies are based on this six-month portfolio formation period ~J 5 6!. The sample period is 1965 to 1995.
Portfolio characteristics are presented for 10 price momentum and three trading volume portfolios involving all NYSE0AMEX stocks ~Table II
and Table III, Panel A!, five price momentum and five trading volume portfolios involving only the largest 50% of NYSE0AMEX stocks ~Table III,
Panel B!, and three price momentum and 10 trading volume portfolios ~Table III, Panel C!. R1 represents the loser portfolio. R10 ~R5! represents
the winner portfolio when we form 10 ~five! price momentum portfolios. V1 represents the lowest trading volume portfolio. V3 ~V5! represents
the highest trading volume portfolio when we form three ~five! volume portfolios. Return refers to the geometric average monthly return in
percentages during the last six months, and Volume represents the average daily turnover in percentages during the last six months. SzRnk
represents the time-series average of the median size decile of the portfolio on the portfolio formation date. Price represents the time-series
average of the median stock price of the portfolio in dollars on the portfolio formation date. N represents the average number of firms in each
portfolio.
Panel A: 10 Price Momentum, Three Trading Volume Portfolios
V1 V2 V3
Portfolio Return Volume SzRnk Price N Return Volume SzRnk Price N Return Volume SzRnk Price N
R1 ~loser! 25.84 0.0588 2.7 7.65 57 26.14 0.1430 3.3 8.51 57 26.84 0.3232 4.5 10.64 84
R5 0.25 0.0608 5.4 19.41 78 0.25 0.1381 6.6 22.25 71 0.25 0.2822 6.4 20.59 49
R10 ~winner! 7.46 0.0661 4.3 17.39 35 7.71 0.1480 4.8 18.77 50 8.79 0.3653 5.4 20.74 112
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V1 V5 V10
Portfolio Return Volume SzRnk Price N Return Volume SzRnk Price N Return Volume SzRnk Price N
R1 ~loser! 22.98 0.0309 3.5 11.10 75 23.11 0.1267 4.7 13.98 64 24.70 0.5085 5.4 15.00 63
R2 0.62 0.0310 4.7 17.58 75 0.67 0.1265 6.7 23.28 74 0.70 0.4925 6.2 20.74 38
R3 ~winner! 4.02 0.0316 4.8 19.65 48 4.35 0.1271 6.1 23.06 61 6.85 0.5254 5.8 21.93 96
Panel C: Five Price Momentum, Five Trading Volume Portfolios
V1 V3 V5
Portfolio Return Volume SzRnk Price N Return Volume SzRnk Price N Return Volume SzRnk Price N
R1 ~loser! 24.22 0.0439 3.1 9.37 80 24.47 0.1411 4.1 11.13 73 25.51 0.3886 5.0 12.90 90
R2 0.66 0.0450 5.0 18.78 92 0.67 0.1397 6.8 23.17 86 0.67 0.3650 6.2 20.66 53
R5 ~winner! 5.48 0.0471 4.6 18.62 50 5.80 0.1420 5.5 21.58 68 7.39 0.4155 5.7 21.69 131
Panel D: Largest 50% of NYSE0AMEX Stocks ~5 3 5!
V1 V3 V5
Portfolio Return Volume SzRnk Price N Return Volume SzRnk Price N Return Volume SzRnk Price N
R1 ~loser! 22.70 0.0598 7.5 23.37 33 22.83 0.1523 8.1 25.11 37 24.08 0.3857 7.4 21.61 50
R3 0.99 0.0627 7.7 29.77 50 1.00 0.1503 8.6 31.81 42 1.01 0.3695 7.7 28.61 23
R5 ~winner! 4.90 0.0597 7.6 32.85 25 5.08 0.1533 8.1 34.63 33 6.67 0.4165 7.5 31.74 68
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Three-Factor Regressions of Monthly Excess Returns on Price Momentum-Volume Portfolios
This table summarizes three-factor regression results for monthly returns on price momentum and volume portfolios for ~J 5 6, K 5 6! and
~J 5 12, K 5 12! portfolio strategies. J represents the months before the portfolio formation date, and K represents in months after the portfolio
formation date. K represents monthly holding periods where K 5 three, six, nine, or 12 months. R1 represents the loser portfolio. R10 represents
the winner portfolio. V1 represents the lowest trading volume portfolio. V3 represents the highest trading volume portfolio. The three-factor
regression is as follows:
ri 2 rf 5 ai 1 bi~rm 2 rj! 1 siSMB 1 hiHML 1 ei,
where rm is the return on the NYSE0AMEX0Nasdaq value-weighted market index, SMB is the small firm factor, and HML is the value factor.
The numbers within parentheses represent White heteroskedasticity corrected t-statistics. There are 372 total months from January 1965 to
December 1995.
Panel A: J 5 6, K 5 6
V1 V2 V3 V3 2 V1 V1 V2 V3 V3 2 V1 V1 V2 V3 V3 2 V1
Portfolio abs
R1 20.56 20.96 21.54 20.98 1.02 1.12 1.26 0.24 1.51 1.50 1.55 0.04
~22.96!~ 2 5.78!~ 2 9.97!~ 2 5.65!~ 16.24!~ 19.18!~ 23.39!~ 4.46!~ 12.88!~ 15.04!~ 15.88!~ 0.49!
R5 0.09 0.02 20.21 20.30 0.86 1.04 1.17 0.31 0.72 0.75 0.99 0.27
~1.29!~ 0.26!~ 2 2.55!~ 2 2.57!~ 29.37!~ 47.21!~ 46.57!~ 7.53!~ 16.93!~ 20.36!~ 26.39!~ 4.69!
R10 0.30 0.47 0.28 20.02 0.95 1.06 1.15 0.20 0.93 0.93 1.03 0.10
~2.20!~ 4.16!~ 2.32!~ 2 0.12!~ 22.15!~ 28.98!~ 25.77!~ 3.91!~ 13.32!~ 14.28!~ 14.32!~ 1.21!
R10 2 R1 0.86 1.42 1.82 0.96 20.07 20.06 20.11 20.04 20.58 20.58 20.52 0.06
~3.48!~ 6.24!~ 8.56!~ 5.00!~ 2 0.86!~ 2 0.68!~ 2 1.28!~ 2 0.74!~ 2 3.88!~ 2 3.85!~ 2 3.58!~ 0.63!
h Adj. R
2
R1 0.77 0.53 0.38 20.39 0.77 0.83 0.87 0.20
~6.86!~ 5.45!~ 4.11!~ 2 4.33!
R5 0.42 0.36 0.16 20.26 0.92 0.96 0.95 0.47
~7.60!~ 8.88!~ 4.23!~ 2 3.93!
R10 0.44 0.21 20.06 20.51 0.80 0.88 0.89 0.29
~6.17!~ 3.17!~ 2 0.78!~ 2 5.72!
R10 2 R1 20.33 20.32 20.44 20.11 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.00
~22.58!~ 2 2.26!~ 2 2.91!~ 2 1.21!
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V1 V2 V3 V3 2 V1 V1 V2 V3 V3 2 V1 V1 V2 V3 V3 2 V1
Portfolio abs
R1 20.59 20.86 21.28 20.69 1.02 1.12 1.25 0.22 1.60 1.61 1.69 0.09
~23.09!~ 2 5.01!~ 2 8.09!~ 2 4.07!~ 15.95!~ 20.12!~ 23.45!~ 4.53!~ 14.01!~ 15.76!~ 16.40!~ 1.03!
R5 0.17 0.02 20.30 20.47 0.88 1.04 1.18 0.30 0.71 0.75 1.03 0.32
~2.51!~ 0.39!~ 2 3.94!~ 2 4.40!~ 31.42!~ 44.06!~ 47.42!~ 8.24!~ 16.11!~ 19.69!~ 26.40!~ 5.80!
R10 0.42 0.47 0.12 20.30 0.95 1.08 1.18 0.23 0.93 0.85 1.03 0.10
~3.17!~ 4.57!~ 1.05!~ 2 1.99!~ 26.70!~ 35.65!~ 29.41!~ 5.58!~ 13.02!~ 14.54!~ 16.28!~ 1.48!
R10 2 R1 1.01 1.33 1.40 0.39 20.07 20.05 20.06 0.01 20.68 20.75 20.66 0.02
~4.28!~ 6.06!~ 6.98!~ 2.05!~ 2 0.89!~ 2 0.68!~ 2 0.85!~ 0.12!~ 2 4.39!~ 2 5.21!~ 2 4.79!~ 0.17!
h Adj. R
2
R1 0.82 0.66 0.55 20.27 0.76 0.83 0.87 0.16
~7.21!~ 6.59!~ 5.87!~ 2 3.23!
R5 0.44 0.38 0.23 20.21 0.92 0.96 0.96 0.51
~8.39!~ 8.90!~ 6.18!~ 2 3.76!
R10 0.30 0.02 20.22 20.52 0.81 0.90 0.91 0.34
~4.36!~ 0.42!~ 2 3.07!~ 2 7.05!
R10 2 R1 20.52 20.64 20.77 20.25 0.18 0.26 0.29 0.02
~23.74!~ 2 4.66!~ 2 5.34!~ 2 2.92!
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value and glamour stocks ~highest and lowest 40 percent by book-to-market
ratio! in Fama and French ~1993!. For ~J 5 6, K 5 6!, the difference in
estimated HML loadings for our low and high volume winner portfolios
~R10V3 2 R10V1! is 20.51. This is comparable to the spread Fama and
French obtain when they separate firms on the basis of high versus low
book-to-market ratios.15 In short, low ~high! volume stocks earn positive ~neg-
ative! excess returns when high B0M stocks do well. These results lay a
foundation for our attempt to interpret the findings of the paper and under-
stand the nature of the information provided by trading volume ~see
Section III!.
The factor loadings on SMB also provide interesting information. Table V
shows that our high and low volume portfolios exhibit virtually no difference
in their sensitivity to the SMB factor. In the winner and loser portfolios ~R10
and R1!, differences in trading volume have no explanatory power for a stock’s
sensitivity to firm size. In the intermediate return portfolio ~R5!, there is in
fact some evidence that high volume stocks actually behave more like small
stocks than low volume stocks. Because small stocks are generally more
illiquid, this evidence runs counter to the liquidity explanation for the vol-
ume effect.
E. Long-Horizon Results
Table VI presents long-term ~event time! annual returns to various trad-
ing volume and price momentum portfolios over the next five years. These
results are based on the six-month portfolio formation period ~J 5 6!,1 0
momentum portfolios, and three volume portfolios ~10 3 3!. Year 1, Year 2,
Year 3, Year 4, and Year 5 represent the annual returns of each portfolio in
the five 12-month periods following the portfolio formation date. To correct
for spurious autocorrelation from overlapping observations, we compute
t-statistics using the Hansen and Hodrick ~1980! correction for autocorrela-
tion up to lag 11. Panel A presents raw returns, Panel B reports industry-
adjusted returns, and Panel C reports size-adjusted returns.
The industry adjustment is based on 25 equal-weighted industry portfo-
lios formed by grouping two-digit SIC codes ~see the Appendix!.16 The size
adjustment is based on equal-weighted size decile portfolios. The benchmark
portfolios are formed monthly using all NYSE0AMEX firms available at that
time. Each firm’s benchmark-adjusted return is computed by subtracting
the annual return of the appropriate benchmark portfolio ~a portfolio that
corresponds to the industry grouping of the stock, or the size decile of the
15 See Fama and French ~1993, Table 6!. Combining the estimated hi coefficient for the top
two and bottom two book-to-market quintiles, the Fama–French HML factor differential be-
tween low book-to-market and high book-to-market firms is around 20.7.
16 Our industry partitions are slightly finer than the 20 industries used by Moskowitz and
Grinblatt ~1999! but not as fine as the 48 industries used by Fama and French ~1997!.
2038 The Journal of Financestock, as of the portfolio formation date! from the individual stock’s annual
return. Annual benchmark-adjusted portfolio returns are computed as an
equal-weighted average of the adjusted returns of individual stocks.
The bottom row of each panel reports the annual returns to the price
momentum strategy, after controlling for trading volume ~R10 2 R1!. The
results in Panels A, B, and C show that the price momentum effect dissi-
pates after 12 months in all three volume groups. As we noted earlier, the
spread between winners and losers ~R10 2 R1! is higher for high volume
firms in the first year. However, this effect does not persist beyond Year 1.
The last five columns of Table VI report the difference between high and
low volume firms ~V3 2 V1!, controlling for price momentum. The results
show that low volume losers outperform high volume losers for each of the
next five years. On the winner side, low volume stocks take a little longer to
outperform high volume stocks. As we saw earlier, the difference in returns
between high and low volume winners is not significant in the first year.
However, low volume winners begin to outperform high volume winners in
Year 2, and this difference is seen through to Year 5.
Moskowitz and Grinblatt ~1999! show that a portion of the returns from
momentum strategies is due to industry effects. Panel B shows that industry
adjustment decreases first year price momentum returns in our sample from
12.5 percent to an average of 10.1 percent ~also see Table VII!, a decline of
about 20 percent. More importantly, industry adjustments have virtually no
effect on the volume results. The last five columns of Panel B show that low
volume firms continue to outperform high volume firms in the next five
years even after industry adjustment. This effect is clearly seen in both
winner and loser portfolios and is also robust to firm size adjustments
~Panel C!. Thus, trading volume does not appear to be a proxy for firm size
or industry effects.
F. Price Momentum Reversals
Table VI results ~see Panels B and C! suggest that the magnitude and per-
sistence of price momentum are a function of past trading volume. Price
reversals are more pronounced among low volume losers ~R1V1! and high
volume winners ~R10V3!. Conversely, price momentum is more pronounced
among high volume losers ~R1V3! and low volume winners ~R10V1!. These
observations suggest two volume-based price momentum strategies. We re-
fer to the first, which involves buying low volume winners and selling high
volume losers, as the early-stage strategy, to capture the idea that stocks in
these portfolios exhibit future price momentum over a longer horizon. We
refer to the second strategy, which involves buying high volume winners and
selling low volume losers, as the late-stage momentum strategy to capture
the notion that the price momentum in these stocks reverses faster.
Table VII compares the annual returns of the simple price momentum
strategy ~simple! to those of the early stage ~early! and the late stage ~late!
strategies. Panel A shows that the simple strategy earns 12.5 percent in
Price Momentum and Trading Volume 2039Table VI
Annual Returns for Portfolios Based on Price Momentum and Trading Volume
This table presents annual returns for portfolios based on price momentum and trading volume using data on NYSE0AMEX stocks from 1965 to
1995. The portfolio strategies are based on the six-month portfolio formation period ~J56!. R1 represents the loser portfolio with the lowest returns,
and R10 represents the winner portfolio with the highest returns during the previous J months. V1 represents the portfolio with the lowest trading
volume, and V3 represents the portfolio with the highest trading volume. Year 1, Year 2, Year 3, Year 4, and Year 5 represent the annual returns of
price momentum portfolios in the five 12-month periods following the portfolio formation date. The industry adjustment is based on 25 equal-
weighted industry portfolios ~described in the text! formed by grouping two-digit SIC codes. The size adjustment is based on equal-weighted size
decileportfolios.ThebenchmarkportfoliosareformedontheportfolioformationdateusingallNYSE0AMEXfirmsavailableatthattime.Thebenchmark-
adjusted returns are computed by subtracting the annual returns of the appropriate benchmark portfolio ~a portfolio that corresponds to the in-
dustry grouping of the stock or the size decile of the stock at the time of the portfolio formation! from the individual stock’s annual returns. The
annual portfolio returns are computed as an equal-weighted average of annual returns of the individual stocks in the portfolio. The numbers in
parentheses represent t-statistics based on the Hansen–Hodrick correction for autocorrelation up to lag 11.
V1 V2 V3 V3 2 V1
Portfolio Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Panel A: Raw Returns
R1 12.35 18.50 17.55 18.19 17.29 9.38 17.37 17.38 16.56 15.75 3.93 13.39 12.36 13.37 14.93 28.42 25.11 25.19 24.82 22.36
~2.36!~ 4.15!~ 3.74!~ 4.08!~ 4.70!~ 1.71!~ 3.31!~ 3.26!~ 3.74!~ 4.15!~ 0.85!~ 2.75!~ 2.76!~ 2.95!~ 3.80!~ 2 5.24!~ 2 2.64!~ 2 2.90!~ 2 2.60!~ 2 1.58!
R5 17.74 17.57 16.67 16.13 16.26 17.34 17.60 15.61 14.82 14.95 15.43 15.09 14.21 12.64 14.44 22.31 22.47 22.46 23.49 21.82
~5.28!~ 5.83!~ 5.13!~ 5.26!~ 5.50!~ 4.76!~ 4.85!~ 4.47!~ 4.34!~ 4.64!~ 3.54!~ 3.44!~ 3.53!~ 3.32!~ 3.89!~ 2 1.04!~ 2 1.16!~ 2 1.91!~ 2 2.73!~ 2 1.28!
R10 20.64 19.58 18.21 14.89 14.82 23.44 17.47 17.04 13.91 14.25 19.20 13.14 13.64 11.86 12.52 21.44 26.44 24.57 23.03 22.31
~4.99!~ 4.14!~ 4.63!~ 4.59!~ 4.18!~ 5.18!~ 3.80!~ 4.31!~ 3.78!~ 3.33!~ 4.03!~ 2.86!~ 3.41!~ 2.95!~ 2.96!~ 2 0.65!~ 2 3.15!~ 2 2.46!~ 2 1.84!~ 2 1.48!
R10 2 R1 8.28 1.08 0.66 23.30 22.47 14.06 0.10 20.34 22.66 21.50 15.26 20.25 1.28 21.51 22.42 6.98 21.33 0.62 1.79 0.05
~2.48!~ 0.51!~ 0.27!~ 2 1.31!~ 2 1.77!~ 4.17!~ 0.05!~ 2 0.13!~ 2 1.39!~ 2 0.95!~ 7.13!~ 2 0.15!~ 0.72!~ 2 0.86!~ 2 1.92!~ 2.50!~ 2 0.58!~ 0.32!~ 0.69!~ 0.04!
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R1 23.07 1.97 1.83 3.01 2.15 25.77 0.95 1.88 1.62 0.51 211.33 23.35 23.09 21.21 20.34 28.27 25.31 24.92 24.22 22.49
~21.54!~ 1.19!~ 1.11!~ 2.10!~ 1.97!~ 2 2.53!~ 0.54!~ 0.93!~ 1.37!~ 0.62!~ 2 10.44!~ 2 2.83!~ 2 2.78!~ 2 1.11!~ 2 0.43!~ 2 5.83!~ 2 3.29!~ 2 3.08!~ 2 2.75!~ 2 1.90!
R5 1.34 0.94 1.08 1.23 0.70 0.85 0.95 20.16 0.15 20.16 21.22 21.39 21.28 21.94 20.52 22.56 22.32 22.36 23.17 21.22
~1.34!~ 0.96!~ 1.70!~ 2.00!~ 1.21!~ 1.48!~ 1.57!~ 2 0.38!~ 0.33!~ 2 0.37!~ 2 1.60!~ 2 2.00!~ 2 2.01!~ 2 3.62!~ 2 0.91!~ 2 1.59!~ 2 1.50!~ 2 2.49!~ 2 3.39!~ 2 1.23!
R10 3.00 3.10 1.95 0.29 0.05 5.60 1.23 1.16 20.65 20.62 1.62 22.88 22.09 22.30 22.45 21.38 25.99 24.05 22.59 22.50
~2.39!~ 2.10!~ 1.34!~ 0.29!~ 0.05!~ 4.17!~ 1.35!~ 1.15!~ 2 0.93!~ 2 0.67!~ 1.44!~ 2 3.20!~ 2 3.02!~ 2 3.32!~ 2 3.13!~ 2 0.80!~ 2 3.29!~ 2 2.56!~ 2 1.85!~ 2 1.84!
R10 2 R1 6.07 1.14 0.12 22.72 22.10 11.37 0.28 20.72 22.27 21.13 12.95 0.46 1.00 21.09 22.11 6.89 20.67 0.88 1.63 20.01
~2.30!~ 0.71!~ 0.07!~ 2 1.36!~ 2 1.58!~ 3.90!~ 0.17!~ 2 0.35!~ 2 1.67!~ 2 0.91!~ 7.99!~ 0.32!~ 0.74!~ 2 0.97!~ 2 2.37!~ 2.95!~ 2 0.34!~ 0.48!~ 0.72!~ 2 0.01!
Panel C: Size-Adjusted Returns
R1 24.35 0.16 20.19 1.70 1.14 27.62 20.53 0.39 1.08 0.32 213.04 23.92 23.81 21.32 20.27 28.70 24.08 23.63 23.03 21.41
~23.56!~ 0.12!~ 2 0.16!~ 1.62!~ 1.16!~ 2 4.62!~ 2 0.45!~ 0.25!~ 0.91!~ 0.45!~ 2 10.89!~ 2 3.55!~ 2 3.03!~ 2 0.85!~ 2 0.30!~ 2 7.06!~ 2 2.47!~ 2 2.61!~ 2 1.88!~ 2 1.03!
R5 1.93 1.44 1.18 1.32 0.81 1.20 1.59 0.40 0.58 0.15 21.59 21.60 21.21 21.62 20.45 23.52 23.04 22.39 22.94 21.26
~1.81!~ 1.41!~ 1.60!~ 1.68!~ 1.10!~ 2.41!~ 3.77!~ 1.00!~ 1.62!~ 0.36!~ 2 1.96!~ 2 2.19!~ 2 1.68!~ 2 3.03!~ 2 0.69!~ 2 2.02!~ 2 1.83!~ 2 1.89!~ 2 2.48!~ 2 0.98!
R10 3.45 2.74 1.35 20.43 20.50 6.14 0.57 0.74 20.69 20.65 2.04 23.60 22.20 22.44 22.43 21.41 26.34 23.55 22.01 21.92
~2.57!~ 1.64!~ 0.92!~ 2 0.36!~ 2 0.52!~ 4.36!~ 0.62!~ 0.77!~ 2 0.94!~ 2 0.80!~ 1.43!~ 2 3.47!~ 2 2.19!~ 2 2.82!~ 2 2.54!~ 2 0.79!~ 2 3.02!~ 2 1.95!~ 2 1.21!~ 2 1.23!
R10 2 R1 7.80 2.58 1.54 22.13 21.64 13.76 1.10 0.35 21.76 20.96 15.08 0.32 1.62 21.11 22.15 7.28 22.26 0.08 1.02 20.51
~3.44!~ 1.34!~ 0.83!~ 2 1.16!~ 2 1.28!~ 5.46!~ 0.72!~ 0.18!~ 2 1.08!~ 2 0.84!~ 7.28!~ 0.24!~ 1.04!~ 2 0.63!~ 2 2.04!~ 3.16!~ 2 1.08!~ 0.05!~ 0.46!~ 2 0.32!
P
r
i
c
e
M
o
m
e
n
t
u
m
a
n
d
T
r
a
d
i
n
g
V
o
l
u
m
e
2
0
4
1Table VII
Early and Late Stage Strategies Based on
Price Momentum and Trading Volume
This table summarizes annual returns from early ~R10V1 2 R1V3 or R5V1 2 R1V5! and late
stage ~R10V3 2 R1V1 or R5V5 2 R1V1! price momentum-trading volume strategies and com-
pares them to the returns from a simple price momentum strategy ~R10 2 R1 or R5 2 R1! for
the time period 1965 to 1995. Early represents a zero investment portfolio that is long low
volume winners ~R10V1 or R5V1! and short high volume losers ~R1V3 or R1V5!. Late repre-
sents a zero investment portfolio that is long high volume winners ~R10V3 or R5V5! and short
low volume losers ~R1V1!. R1 represents the loser portfolio with the lowest returns and R10
represents the winner portfolio with the highest returns during the previous six months. V1
represents the portfolio with the lowest trading volume, and V3 ~V5! represents the portfolio
with the highest trading volume when three ~five! volume portfolios are formed. The volume is
computed as the average daily turnover over the previous six months. Year 1, Year 2, Year 3,
Year 4, and Year 5 represent the compounded returns in each of the five 12-month periods
following the portfolio formation month. The number of monthly observations is 325, except for
Panel D, where it is 265. The numbers within parentheses are t-statistics computed with the
Hansen–Hodrick autocorrelation correction up to 11 lags.
Strategy Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Panel A: Raw Returns
R10 2 R1 ~simple! 12.49 21.10 20.32 22.77 22.96
~5.04!~ 2 0.66!~ 2 0.15!~ 2 1.68!~ 2 2.46!
R10V3 2 R1V1 ~late! 6.84 25.35 23.91 26.33 24.78
~2.53!~ 2 2.17!~ 2 1.53!~ 2 3.54!~ 2 2.64!
R10V1 2 R1V3 ~early! 16.70 6.19 5.85 1.53 20.11
~5.85!~ 3.16!~ 2.56!~ 0.64!~ 2 0.06!
~R10V3 2 R1V1! 2 ~R10 2 R1! 25.65 24.25 23.59 23.56 21.81
~25.21!~ 2 3.00!~ 2 2.93!~ 2 3.14!~ 2 1.37!
~R10V1 2 R1V3! 2 ~R10 2 R1! 4.21 7.29 6.17 4.29 2.85
~2.40!~ 3.40!~ 2.91!~ 2.92!~ 1.73!
Panel B: Industry-Adjusted Returns
R10 2 R1 ~simple! 10.11 20.82 20.65 22.27 22.67
~5.19!~ 2 0.57!~ 2 0.41!~ 2 2.20!~ 2 3.33!
R10V3 2 R1V1 ~late! 4.69 24.85 23.92 25.31 24.60
~2.04!~ 2 2.33!~ 2 2.04!~ 2 3.99!~ 2 3.21!
R10V1 2 R1V3 ~early! 14.33 6.45 5.05 1.50 0.39
~7.34!~ 4.23!~ 2.77!~ 0.92!~ 0.27!
~R10V3 2 R1V1! 2 ~R10 2 R1! 25.42 24.03 23.28 23.05 21.94
~26.09!~ 2 3.23!~ 2 3.25!~ 2 3.42!~ 2 1.65!
~R10V1 2 R1V3! 2 ~R10 2 R1! 4.22 7.27 5.69 3.77 3.05
~3.02!~ 3.82!~ 3.05!~ 3.13!~ 2.11!
Panel C: Size-Adjusted Returns
R10 2 R1 ~simple! 12.17 20.21 0.52 21.84 22.30
~6.25!~ 2 0.16!~ 0.31!~ 2 1.32!~ 2 2.61!
R10V3 2 R1V1 ~late! 6.39 23.76 22.01 24.14 23.57
~3.24!~ 2 1.91!~ 2 1.08!~ 2 3.10!~ 2 2.32!
R10V1 2 R1V3 ~early! 16.49 6.66 5.17 0.89 20.23
~7.43!~ 3.18!~ 2.32!~ 0.39!~ 2 0.15!
~R10V3 2 R1V1! 2 ~R10 2 R1! 25.78 23.55 22.53 22.30 21.26
~27.00!~ 2 2.68!~ 2 2.35!~ 2 2.02!~ 2 1.06!
~R10V1 2 R1V3! 2 ~R10 2 R1! 4.33 6.87 4.65 2.73 2.07
~3.13!~ 3.18!~ 2.32!~ 1.83!~ 1.31!
2042 The Journal of FinanceYear 1 but the momentum dissipates after 12 months. The late strategy
earns 6.8 percent in Year 1 but immediately begins losing in subsequent
years. In contrast, the early strategy earns significant positive returns for
Table 7—Continued
Strategy Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Panel D: Size- and Book-to-Market-Adjusted Returns
R3 2 R1 ~simple! 11.50 1.70 2.62 20.17 21.68
~5.98!~ 1.29!~ 1.49!~ 2 .08!~ 2 1.55!
R3V10 2 R1V1 ~late! 7.14 20.24 1.16 21.94 22.96
~3.86!~ 2 0.15!~ 0.67!~ 2 0.84!~ 2 1.60!
R3V1 2 R1V10 ~early! 15.03 4.39 3.83 1.08 22.95
~6.55!~ 2.46!~ 1.52!~ 0.35!~ 2 1.68!
~R3V10 2 R1V1! 2 ~R3 2 R1! 24.36 21.95 21.46 21.77 21.28
~24.13!~ 2 1.75!~ 2 1.27!~ 2 1.19!~ 2 0.87!
~R3V1 2 R1V10! 2 ~R3 2 R1! 3.54 2.68 1.21 1.25 21.28
~2.59!~ 2.16!~ 0.79!~ 0.67!~ 2 0.83!
Panel E: Three Price Momentum, 10 Volume Portfolios
R3 2 R1 ~simple! 6.98 20.61 20.22 21.48 22.08
~4.30!~ 2 0.58!~ 2 0.15!~ 2 1.35!~ 2 2.05!
R3V10 2 R1V1 ~late! 20.39 25.85 24.93 25.12 25.42
~20.14!~ 2 2.20!~ 2 2.31!~ 2 3.03!~ 2 2.81!
R3V1 2 R1V10 ~early! 15.53 5.95 7.00 3.97 0.22
~6.40!~ 2.34!~ 3.18!~ 1.61!~ 0.11!
~R3V10 2 R1V1! 2 ~R3 2 R1! 27.37 25.23 24.71 23.63 23.34
~23.09!~ 2 2.54!~ 2 2.39!~ 2 2.00!~ 2 1.83!
~R3V1 2 R1V10! 2 ~R3 2 R1! 8.55 6.57 7.22 5.45 2.31
~3.96!~ 2.45!~ 3.82!~ 2.75!~ 1.16!
Panel F: Five Price Momentum, Five Volume Portfolios
R5 2 R1 ~simple! 9.42 20.55 20.10 22.10 22.44
~4.62!~ 2 0.40!~ 2 0.06!~ 2 1.53!~ 2 2.02!
R5V5 2 R1V1 ~late! 2.96 24.91 24.72 25.90 24.99
~1.18!~ 2 2.05!~ 2 2.31!~ 2 3.77!~ 2 2.92!
R5V1 2 R1V5 ~early! 16.00 5.96 7.42 1.86 21.05
~6.11!~ 3.05!~ 3.23!~ 0.75!~ 2 0.55!
~R5V5 2 R1V1! 2 ~R5 2 R1! 26.46 24.37 24.62 23.80 22.55
~23.67!~ 2 2.64!~ 2 3.63!~ 2 2.78!~ 2 1.86!
~R5V1 2 R1V5! 2 ~R5 2 R1! 6.58 6.50 7.52 3.96 1.39
~3.27!~ 2.92!~ 3.60!~ 2.30!~ 0.75!
Panel G: Largest 50% of NYSE0AMEX Stocks ~5 3 5!
R5 2 R1 ~simple! 7.71 20.92 20.49 20.98 22.10
~3.83!~ 2 0.74!~ 2 0.33!~ 2 0.72!~ 2 1.81!
R5V5 2 R1V1 ~late! 5.42 22.68 22.23 22.27 24.72
~1.61!~ 2 1.18!~ 2 1.33!~ 2 1.19!~ 2 2.74!
R5V1 2 R1V5 ~early! 11.16 2.19 3.64 0.62 22.10
~3.87!~ 1.04!~ 1.52!~ 0.27!~ 2 0.99!
~R5V5 2 R1V1! 2 ~R5 2 R1! 22.29 21.75 21.74 21.29 22.62
~21.04!~ 2 1.13!~ 2 1.22!~ 2 0.84!~ 2 1.87!
~R5V1 2 R1V5! 2 ~R5 2 R1! 3.45 3.11 4.13 1.60 20.01
~1.34!~ 1.25!~ 2.00!~ 0.95!~ 0.00!
Price Momentum and Trading Volume 2043Years 1, 2, and 3 before the effect dissipates. Compared to the simple strat-
egy, early ~late! momentum strategies earn significantly higher ~lower! re-
turns in each of the next four years. Panels B and C show that these effects
are robust when returns are adjusted for industry and size effects. Panel D
shows the effect is weaker but still quite evident when both firm size and
book-to-market are controlled for. Similarly, Panels E through G show this
effect holds for various alternative partitions of the data and even for firms
in the largest 50 percent of the NYSE0AMEX population.
Figures 1 and 2 provide graphical representations of buy-and-hold returns
to these three strategies.17 Figure 1 reports buy-and-hold industry-adjusted
17 The buy-and-hold abnormal returns ~BHAR! are computed as follows:
BHARi 5 )
i51
T
~1 1 rit! 2 )
i51
T
~1 1 rmt!
Figure 1. Buy-and-hold industry-adjusted long-term returns to various momentum
strategies. This graph depicts buy-and-hold industry-adjusted returns to three price momen-
tum strategies, formulated using past returns and trading volume from the previous six months
~J 5 6!. Each month, stocks are independently sorted into 10 price momentum portfolios and
three volume portfolios. The simple price momentum strategy ~simple! buys top decile winners
and sells bottom decile losers ~R10 2 R1!. The early stage momentum strategy ~early! buys low
volume winners and sells high volume losers ~R10V1 2 R1V3!. The late stage momentum strat-
egy ~late! buys high volume winners and sells low volume losers ~R10V3 2 R1V1!. The industry
adjustment is based on 25 equal-weighted industry portfolios formed by grouping two-digit SIC
codes ~see the Appendix!. Each firm’s benchmark-adjusted return is computed by subtracting
the annual return of the appropriate benchmark portfolio ~a portfolio that corresponds to the
industry grouping of the stock as of the portfolio formation date! from the individual stock’s
annual return.
2044 The Journal of Financereturns, whereas Figure 2 reports buy-and-hold size-adjusted returns. These
graphs show that both long-horizon underreaction and overreaction can oc-
cur in the data and indeed can be reconciled through judicious use of past
trading volume. Looking at the returns for late stage stocks in isolation, we
might be tempted to conclude that price momentum is an overreaction to
fundamental news. Yet the same graph shows that the early stage momen-
tum stocks exhibit price continuation for three to five years. Looking at the
early stage momentum stocks in isolation, we might conclude markets gen-
erally underreact to information. In fact, both effects are part of a more
general process by which information is incorporated into prices. More gen-
where rit is the annual return in stock i and rmt is the annual return on the benchmark. The
benchmark annual returns are computed by equally weighting the annual returns of constitu-
ent securities. The time-series average of the cross-sectional mean buy-and-hold abnormal re-
turn is depicted in Figures 2 and 3.
Figure 2. Buy-and-hold size-adjusted long-term returns to various momentum strat-
egies. This graph depicts the buy-and-hold size-adjusted returns to three price momentum
strategies, formulated using past returns and trading volume from the previous six months
~J 5 6!. Each month, stocks are independently sorted into 10 price momentum portfolios and
three volume portfolios. The simple price momentum strategy ~simple! buys top decile winners
and sells bottom decile losers ~R10 2 R1!. The early stage momentum strategy ~early! buys low
volume winners and sells high volume losers ~R10V1 2R1V3!. The late stage momentum strat-
egy ~late! buys high volume winners and sells low volume losers ~R10V3 2 R1V1!. The size
adjustment is based on 10 equal-weighted sizes. Each firm’s benchmark-adjusted return is
computed by subtracting the annual return of the appropriate benchmark portfolio ~a portfolio
that corresponds to the size decile of the stock as of the portfolio formation date! from the
individual stock’s annual return.
Price Momentum and Trading Volume 2045erally, this evidence shows that the duration and magnitude of price mo-
mentum can be predicted based on firm characteristics, such as trading volume.
Table VIII provides additional evidence on the timing of momentum re-
versals conditional on trading volume and firm size. This table reports the
time-series average of slope coefficients estimated from monthly Fama–
MacBeth cross-sectional regressions of the following model:
rt1K,i 5 aK 1 bK rt,i 1 ut1K,i
where subscript i refers to stock i, rt1K,i is the annual return K years ahead,
and rt,i is the prior year’s ~pre–portfolio formation! return, where K 5 1, 2,
3, 4, or 5. The time-series average of bK is an estimate of the average auto-
correlation ~across all stocks! between last year’s return and future returns.
The cross-sectional regression is run each month using all stocks available
at the beginning of the month, and the standard errors of the time-series
means are computed using the Hansen and Hodrick ~1980! correction with
11 lags.
Reported table values represent the average slope coefficient estimated
with various subsamples. The first two columns provide a more formal test
of the momentum reversal phenomenon reported in Table I. In column 1,
which involves all stocks, the slope coefficient is positive and significant in
Year 1, negative and insignificant in Years 2 and 3, and negative and sig-
nificant in Years 4 and 5. These return autocorrelation patterns confirm the
presence of price momentum in Year 1 and strong price reversals in Years 4
and 5. Column 2 provides similar evidence using only winner and loser stocks.
Columns 3 and 4 report slope coefficient estimates when only early stage
or late stage stocks, based on past trading volume, are included in the regres-
sions. These results show that the Year 1 price momentum is much stronger
for early stage firms. Moreover, early stage firms show significant price
momentum up to the third year, whereas late stage firms show strong price
reversal starting in Year 2. Evidently, the magnitude and persistence of
price momentum are a function of trading volume. We obtain similar results
using size- or industry-adjusted returns ~not reported in the paper!.
Columns 5 and 6 conduct the same test using firm size rather than trad-
ing volume as the conditioning variable. The results for this subset of firms
are weak and inconsistent, indicating that firm size is not a good substitute
for trading volume in the prediction of return autocorrelation patterns. In
other words, the information conveyed by trading volume about the persis-
tence of future price momentum is not driven by its correlation with firm
size.
It is useful to summarize the empirical facts at this point. Thus far we
have seen that low volume stocks generally earn higher returns than high
volume stocks. This fact is consistent with the liquidity effect. However, we
have also seen that the price momentum effect is stronger among high vol-
ume stocks, raising questions about the liquidity explanation. We find that
2046 The Journal of FinanceTable VIII
Regression Tests of Return Continuation and Reversals Involving Simple,
Early Stage, and Late Stage Price Momentum Strategies
This table reports time-series average of slope coefficients estimated from monthly Fama–MacBeth cross-sectional regressions run from January
1965 to January 1992. The regression model is
rt1K,i 5 aK 1 bK rt,i 1 ut1K,i,
where the subscript i refers to stock i. rt1K,i is annual return K years ahead, and rt,i is the previous year’s ~pre–portfolio formation! return where
K 5 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5. The cross-sectional regression is run each month, which results in the estimated slope coefficients being autocorrelated ~due
to the overlap! up to lag 11. Therefore, the standard errors of the time-series means are computed using the Hansen–Hodrick ~1980! correction.
The resulting t-statistics are presented in parentheses. The number of monthly observations is 324. R5 and R1 refer to past 12-month momentum
quintile winners and losers. V5 and V1 refer to past 12-month high volume and low volume quintiles. S5 and S1 refer to largest and smallest size
quintiles based on market cap at the time of portfolio formation. Regressions are run using several different samples: all stocks, stocks in
extreme price momentum portfolios ~R1 and R5! only, stocks in early stage portfolios ~R5V1 and R1V5! only, and stocks in late stage portfolios
~R5V5 and R1V1! only. For comparison, regressions are also run using size-based price momentum portfolios where firm size, rather than trading
volume, is used as an indicator of early and late stage momentum.
Time-Series Average Slope Coefficients, bK
Simple Price Momentum Volume Based Momentum Strategies Size Based Momentum Strategies
K All Stocks
Stocks in R1
and R5 only
Early Stage
~R5V1 and R1V5!
Late Stage
~R5V5 and R1V1!
Early Stage
~R5S1 and R1S5!
Late Stage
~R5S5 and R1S1!
1 0.0673 0.0685 0.1303 0.0229 0.0840 0.0210
~4.37!~ 4.57!~ 4.69!~ 1.73!~ 2.72!~ 0.41!
2 20.0072 20.0074 0.0388 20.0219 0.0148 20.0517
~20.44!~ 2 0.46!~ 1.50!~ 2 1.61!~ 0.45!~ 2 1.20!
3 20.0073 20.0088 0.0629 20.0367 20.0069 20.0552
~20.43!~ 2 0.53!~ 2.37!~ 2 3.11!~ 2 0.31!~ 2 1.16!
4 20.0288 20.0270 0.0254 20.0436 0.0060 20.0610
~22.27!~ 2 2.10!~ 1.00!~ 2 4.14!~ 0.28!~ 2 1.97!
5 20.0321 20.0292 20.0067 20.0305 20.0154 20.0502
~22.58!~ 2 2.54!~ 2 0.33!~ 2 2.25!~ 2 0.75!~ 2 1.67!
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7past trading volume predicts the magnitude and timing of price momentum
reversals. Finally, we have seen evidence that the information in trading
volume is not about firm size or industry effects. In the next section, we
provide additional evidence on the nature of the information provided by
trading volume.
IV. Information Content of Trading Volume
Why does trading volume predict future returns? Is it a proxy for differences
in liquidity, or the rate of information diffusion, or something else? In this
section, we conduct additional tests to help answer these questions. Our goal
is to better understand the information content of trading volume and to
evaluate this evidence in the light of existing models of investor behavior.
A. Volume as a Liquidity Proxy
First we explore the relationship between trading volume ~turnover! and
other proxies of liquidity. Although average daily dollar volume is an intu-
itive proxy for liquidity, it does not necessarily follow that the average daily
turnover is also a liquidity proxy. The turnover measure we use is, in effect,
average daily dollar volume scaled by a firm’s total market capitalization.
The effect of dividing by firm size is to create a volume measure that may
not have strong correlations with traditional liquidity proxies.
To provide more direct evidence on the relation between liquidity and turn-
over, the following table reports cross-sectional Spearman rank correlations
of trading volume to firm size, stock price, and relative spread.18 The sample
period is 1964 to 1995, except for the relative spread results, which are
based on the 1979 to 1989 time period ~the data is the same as that used in
Eleswarapu and Reinganum ~1993!!.
Firm Size Stock Price Relative Spread
Turnover 0.20 0.11 20.12
This chart shows that trading volume ~as measured by average daily turn-
over! is not highly correlated with common proxies for market liquidity. The
low degree of correlation with these variables suggests turnover may be pro-
viding information about something other than market liquidity.
Guidance on where to look emerges from the results in Table V. Recall
Table V shows that the returns on low volume stocks are more positively
correlated with HML than are returns on high volume stocks. In other words,
high volume stocks behave like glamour stocks, whereas low volume stocks
18 These results are based on annual pooled cross-sectional data measured as of June 30
each year; computing year-by-year correlations and averaging the annual estimates yields sim-
ilar results.
2048 The Journal of Financebehave like value stocks. Thus, trading volume seems to provide informa-
tion about relative under- or overvaluation of stocks. In the next subsec-
tion, we investigate this possibility by conducting additional tests that focus
on a possible link between trading volume and measures of under- or
overvaluation.
B. Firm Characteristics Related to Profitability
and Under- or Overvaluation
Table IX reports the pattern of past and future profitability and firm char-
acteristics that proxy for under- or overvaluation across high and low vol-
ume portfolios. Panel A reports the results when firms are divided into 10
price momentum and three volume portfolios ~the 10 3 3 partition!, and
Panel B reports the results when firms are divided into five price momen-
tum and five volume portfolios ~the 5 3 5 partition!.
Each panel reports the number of analysts following the firm ~NANA!, the
forecasted long-term earnings growth rate ~Ltg!, the cumulative buy-and-
hold returns over the five years prior to the portfolio formation date ~LtRet!,
and the book-to-market ratio just before the formation date ~B0M!. In addi-
tion, Table IX provides the return on equity from the most recent fiscal year
end ~ROE~0!! and also the change in ROE over the last three years ~DROE~2!!
and the next three years ~DROE~1!!. All values represent time-series aver-
ages of portfolio medians. For NANA and Ltg, we used the subset of firms
covered by I0B0E0S ~sample period 1979 to 1995!.
The most striking fact that emerges from Table IX is that high volume
stocks are generally glamour stocks and low volume stocks are generally
value or neglected stocks. For example, Panel B shows that high volume
stocks have greater analyst coverage ~NANA is 3.6 for low volume losers
and 9.6 for high volume losers!, have higher forecasted earnings ~long-term
growth per year, Ltg, is 9.33 percent for low volume losers and 12.85 percent
for high volume losers!, lower book-to-market ratios ~B0M is 0.815 for high
volume losers and 1.125 for low volume losers!, and higher return-on-equity
~ROE~0! is 11.3 percent for high volume losers and 7.3 percent for low vol-
ume losers!. These differences are all statistically significant. The results
for winner portfolios are symmetrical and comparable in magnitude.
Table IX shows that high volume firms and low volume firms also differ
significantly in terms of their past operating and price performance. In gen-
eral, low volume losers have experienced a greater decline in ROE over the
past three years compared to high volume losers. The pattern is symmetri-
cal, but reversed in direction, among winners: high volume winners have
experienced an increase in ROE, whereas low volume winners have experi-
enced a decline in ROE. In spite of this, high volume stocks—both winners
and losers—have significantly worse operating performance ~significantly
lower ROE increases! in the future than low volume stocks. This result is
striking, because, ex ante, analysts forecast higher earnings growth ~Ltg! for
high volume firms. High volume firms have also experienced a recent in-
Price Momentum and Trading Volume 2049Table IX
Long-Term Performance Characteristics for Price Momentum and Trading Volume Portfolios
This table reports average number of analysts, long-term growth forecasts, long-term past returns, book-to-market ratio, and return on equity
based on time-series of cross-sectional medians for price momentum and trading volume portfolios. The sample period is January 1965 to
December 1995. The accounting numbers are obtained from COMPUSTAT annual files for all NYSE0AMEX firms that had data available in
COMPUSTAT. Because of data unavailability in COMPUSTAT before 1970, there are missing observations due to the absence of sufficient
number of observations in portfolios. R1 represents the loser portfolios, and R10 or R5 represents the winner portfolio. The most recent fiscal
year ending at least four months before the portfolio formation date is assumed to be Year 0 for accounting numbers. V1 represents the lowest
trading volume portfolio, and V3 or V5 represents the highest trading volume portfolio. B0M is the book-to-market ratio just before the portfolio
formation date, where B represents the book value of equity and M represents the market value of equity on the portfolio formation date. ROE
represents the return on equity in percentages defined as ROE~t! 5 100 * NI~t!0@0.5 * @B~t!1B~t 2 1!##, where NI~t! is net income before
extraordinary items for period t, and B~t! is book value for period t. DROE~2! 5 ROE~0! 2 ROE~23! and DROE~1! 5 ROE~3! 2 ROE~0! represent
changes in ROE over the last three years and the next three years, respectively. LtRet represents the cumulative buy-and-hold return in
percentages for a 60-month ~five-year! period prior to the portfolio formation date and represents the long-term stock performance. NANA
represents time-series average of portfolio median number of security analysts making annual earnings forecasts as of the portfolio formation
data, and Ltg represents analyst consensus long-term growth estimates obtained from IBES in percentages. The portfolios for this data item are
based only on stocks that are covered by IBES and cover the 1979 to 1995 time period. Numbers in parentheses represent t-statistics computed
using Hansen–Hodrick standard errors with 60 lags, that is, autocorrelation up to 60 months. The number of time-series observations ranges
between 330 and 368.
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Panel A: 10 Price Momentum, Three Trading Volume Portfolios
R1V1 ~LV 2 Loser! 4.17 9.50 18.31 1.167 10.47 5.22 6.82 25.25 1.61
~23.96!~ 1.90!
R1V3 ~HV 2 Loser! 8.02 12.54 82.38 0.899 13.21 9.77 6.95 23.44 22.81
~22.75!~ 2 4.35!
R1V1 2 R1V3 ~LV 2 HV! 23.85 23.04 264.07 0.268 22.74 24.55 20.13 21.81 4.42
~24.44!~ 2 5.29!~ 2 6.45!~ 4.49!~ 2 3.13!~ 2 4.38!~ 2 0.18!~ 2 2.98!~ 6.09!
R10V1 ~LV 2 Winner! 3.11 9.84 149.07 0.689 11.28 10.55 12.84 20.73 2.29
~21.02!~ 2.12!
R10V3 ~HV 2 Winner! 8.11 12.66 252.75 0.512 11.20 12.17 12.68 0.97 0.51
~1.00!~ 0.54!
R10V1 2 R10V3 ~LV 2 HV! 25.00 22.82 2103.68 0.177 0.08 21.62 0.16 21.71 1.78
~26.02!~ 2 4.24!~ 2 5.13!~ 5.42!~ 0.21!~ 2 2.01!~ 0.28!~ 2 2.23!~ 3.52!
Panel B: Five Price Momentum, Five Trading Volume Portfolios
R1V1 ~LV 2 Loser! 3.59 9.33 28.97 1.125 11.15 7.30 8.42 23.85 1.13
~24.90!~ 2.30!
R1V5 ~HV 2 Loser! 9.62 12.85 108.87 0.815 13.35 11.31 7.68 22.04 23.64
~22.22!~ 2 6.14!
R1V1 2 R1V5 ~LV 2 HV! 26.03 23.52 279.90 0.309 22.20 24.02 0.75 21.82 4.76
~26.24!~ 2 7.15!~ 2 5.42!~ 4.73!~ 2 2.45!~ 2 4.57!~ 0.97!~ 2 4.01!~ 10.49!
R5V1 ~LV 2 Winner! 3.26 9.80 133.53 0.736 12.36 11.30 13.10 21.06 1.80
~22.15!~ 2.48!
R5V5 ~HV 2 Winner! 8.97 12.71 247.62 0.524 11.42 12.26 12.27 0.84 0.02
~0.94!~ 0.02!
R5V1 2 R5V5 ~LV 2 HV! 25.71 22.91 2114.09 0.212 0.94 20.96 0.82 21.90 1.78
~27.59!~ 2 5.23!~ 2 4.67!~ 4.38!~ 2.07!~ 2 1.11!~ 1.14!~ 2 2.79!~ 4.45!
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1crease in ROE. In other words, analysts seem to consistently overestimate
~underestimate! the future profitability of high ~low! volume firms, perhaps
because they naively extrapolate recent operating performance.
Finally, over the past five years, high volume losers ~winners! have sig-
nificantly outperformed low volume losers ~winners!. For example, in Panel B,
LtRet is 28.97 percent for low volume losers and 108.87 percent for high
volume losers. Among winners, LtRet is 133.53 percent for low volume stocks
and 247.62 percent for high volume stocks. Thus, high volume winners and
low volume losers are long-term winners and long-term losers, respectively,
whereas low volume winners and high volume losers are more recent win-
ners and losers.
Figure 3 provides further evidence on the past and future performance of
volume based portfolio strategies. This figure examines the average annual
return for various volume portfolios from Year 24 to Year 15 around the
portfolio formation date. Figure 3A shows that whereas high volume firms
~V5! underperform low volume firms ~V1! in the future they have outper-
formed low volume firms in the past. Thus, high volume stocks appear to be
long-term winners relative to low volume stocks. This is consistent with the
result in Table IX that high volume stocks have lower B0M ratios than low
volume stocks.
The pattern across high volume and low volume stocks is seen in winner
~Figure 3B! and loser ~Figure 3C! portfolios also. Once again, high volume
stocks earned higher returns than low volume firms in each of the past five
years.19 Figure 3B shows that among winners the difference in performance
between low volume and high volume stocks is most pronounced in the im-
mediate past ~Year 0!. Specifically, high volume winners have been “long-
term” winners, whereas low volume winners are only “recent” winners.
Figure 3C shows that among losers the performance gap is most pronounced
in the more distant past ~on or before Year 21!. Specifically, this figure pro-
videsstrikingevidencethatpriortoYear0,highvolumelosershaveinfactbeen
bigwinners~137.34percentinYear21versus216.20percentinYear0!.There-
fore, it is very appropriate to refer to high volume losers as “recent” losers. In
contrast, low volume losers have been underperforming consistently over the
last five years, indicating that they are “long-term” losers.
These results fit our earlier characterization of volume-based momentum
strategies as early and late stage strategies. Specifically, low volume win-
ners only became winners in the recent past, and they exhibit positive mo-
mentum for a longer time in the future. Similarly, high volume losers only
became losers in the recent past and exhibit negative momentum for a lon-
ger time in the future. In contrast, high volume winners and low volume
losers are “long-term” winners and losers, respectively. Our earlier results
show they tend to exhibit faster reversals in the future.
19 Table IX provides formal tests that these differences in past returns are statistically
significant.
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Figure 3. Annual returns from Year −4 to Year +5 for various volume portfolios. These
charts report the annual returns for various volume and volume-based momentum portfolios
from Year 24 to Year 15 around the portfolio formation date. Figure 3A reports the average
annual return for high ~V5! and low ~V1! volume quintile firms. Figures 3B and 3C report
similar statistics for winner portfolios ~R5! and loser portfolios ~R1!, respectively. Price momen-
tum and volume are based on past six-month data in Year 0.
PANEL A
Price Momentum and Trading Volume 2053In sum, Table IX shows that past trading volume is related to a firm’s past
performance measures, current valuation ratios, and analysts’ future fore-
cast errors. Along all these dimensions, low ~high! volume firms display value
~glamour! characteristics. Controlling for price momentum, low ~high! vol-
ume firms have underperformed their peers in the past; they possess lower
~higher! valuation ratios today and tend to over- ~under-! perform analyst
expectations in the future.
C. Abnormal Returns around Quarterly Earnings Announcements
Table IX shows that analysts are more optimistic ~pessimistic! for high
~low! volume stocks but future changes in profitability fail to meet expec-
tations. Thus, trading volume seems to provide information about inves-
tors’ misperception of future earnings. In this subsection, we further explore
this issue by examining the stock price reactions around future quarterly
earnings announcements. If trading volume serves as a proxy for investor
misperceptions of future earnings, these misperceptions should correct
themselves around subsequent earnings announcement dates. Specifically, we
might expect to see more negative ~positive! price reactions for high ~low! vol-
ume stocks. Risk differences should have little effect on short-window re-
turns.Therefore,thistechniqueprovidesadirecttestthatdistinguishesbetween
the mispricing hypothesis and other risk-based explanations.
Table X reports the abnormal returns around quarterly earnings announce-
ments for various price momentum and trading volume portfolios. Table val-
ues represent four-day ~day 22t o1 1 !cumulative abnormal returns ~CAR!
in percentages around quarterly earnings announcements. Returns are re-
ported for the eight quarters before and after the most recent earnings an-
nouncement date just prior to portfolio formation. The NYSE0AMEX0
Nasdaq value-weighted index is used as the benchmark in computing the
CAR. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics computed using the Hansen
and Hodrick ~1980! autocorrelation correction with six moving average lags.
The six-month strategy ~J 5 6, K 5 6! results are reported. Results for other
holding and formation periods are similar.
Row 1 of Panel A shows that loser ~R1! portfolios have significant negative
earnings announcement abnormal returns in the past three quarters ~22t o
0 ! . These losers continue to exhibit losses in the next two quarters, before
staging a modest recovery in quarters t 1 4t ot18. The next two rows show
that the recovery among losers is driven almost entirely by the low volume
~late stage! stocks. The high volume losers keep losing for three quarters
and exhibit no significant CARs beyond quarter t 1 3. The difference in
CARs between high volume and low volume losers averages more than one
percent per announcement and is highly significant for each of the next
eight quarters.
Panel B shows a similar pattern for the winner portfolios. Specifically, low
volume ~early stage! winners experience significant positive announcement
period CARs for the next eight quarters. High volume ~late stage! winners,
2054 The Journal of Financeon the other hand, experience negative CARs starting from quarter t 1 4.
The difference in CARs between low volume winners and high volume win-
ners averages between 0.50 percent and 1.22 percent per announcement and
is highly significant for each of the next eight quarters. Taken together, the
evidence in Panels A and B shows clearly that the ability of low volume
stocks to outperform high volume stocks is related to the better earnings
news received by the low volume stocks in the future.
Panel C reports abnormal returns when firms are sorted only on the basis
of past trading volume. The bottom row shows that high volume ~V3! and
low volume ~V1! firms do not have significantly different returns around
earnings announcements in the past ~quarters 28t o2 1 ! . However, low ~high!
volume firms exhibit significantly more positive ~negative! earnings an-
nouncement returns in the future ~quarters 0 to 18!. On average, V1 firms
earn approximately 0.60 percent more than do V3 firms around each of the
next eight quarterly announcements. Although significant, this difference is
much lower than what was reported in Panels A and B. In sum, Panel C
shows that an independent volume effect exists but that the volume effect is
most pronounced among extreme winners and losers.
Panel D augments these findings by comparing the announcement period
CARs from three different trading strategies. The results in this panel show
that the early stage momentum strategy ~R10V1 2 R1V3! has significantly
more positive announcement period returns than a simple price momentum
strategy ~R10 2 R1! in each of the next eight quarters. Conversely, the late
stage strategy ~R10V3 2 R1V1! results in sharply lower earnings announce-
ment period returns than the simple price momentum strategy.
In sum, we find that the short-window returns also support the view that
trading volume provides information about market misperceptions of future
earnings. Specifically, short-window earnings announcement returns are more
positive for low volume stocks than for high volume stocks. We observe this
difference for the next eight quarters. The effect is strong for both winners
and losers.
D. Changes in Trading Volume
As a final test, we form portfolios based on price momentum and changes
in trading volume. Our goal is to compute a volume measure that purges
each firm of its normal level of trading activity ~i.e., a measure of the ab-
normal trading volume!. If the information content of trading volume is due
to intertemporal variations in a firm’s normal trading activity, this measure
should also predict returns. Furthermore, by using changes in trading vol-
ume, we address any lingering concern that our original results are driven
by liquidity effects.
In Table XI, we replicate our industry-adjusted return prediction tests,
replacing trading volume with the actual change in trading volume. To con-
struct this table, firms are independently sorted into five price momentum
portfolios and five portfolios based on changes in trading volume over the
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Abnormal Returns around Quarterly Earnings Announcements for Price Momentum
and Trading Volume Portfolios
This table reports four-day ~from day 22t od a y1 1 !cumulative abnormal returns ~CAR! in percentages around quarterly earnings announcement
dates for ~J 5 6, K 5 6! price momentum and trading volume portfolios. The sample time period is 1974 to 1995 and contains 264 monthly
observations. The returns are reported for eight quarters before and eight quarters after the most recent earnings announcement date just prior
to the portfolio formation date. The NYSE0AMEX0Nasdaq value-weighted index is used as the benchmark in computing the CAR. The numbers
in parentheses are t-statistics using the Hansen–Hodrick autocorrelation correction with six moving average lags. R1 represents the loser
portfolio, R10 represents the winner portfolio, V1 represents low volume and V3 represents high volume. The most recent quarter is represented
by 0. Quarters prior to the most recent quarter are represented as 2k whereas quarters after the most recent quarter are represented as 1k,
where k 5 1t o8 .Early represents a zero investment portfolio that is long low volume winners ~R10V1! and short high volume losers ~R1V3!. Late
represents a zero investment portfolio that is long high volume winners ~R10V3! and short low volume losers ~R1V1!.
Quarters
Strategy 28 27 26 25 24 23 22 210 1234 5678
Panel A: Loser Portfolios
R1 0.16 0.39 0.46 0.40 0.26 0.25 20.33 22.19 22.42 20.64 20.29 0.10 0.33 0.49 0.65 0.50 0.56
~1.69!~ 4.47!~ 4.75!~ 4.08!~ 2.12!~ 2.21!~ 2 3.40!~ 2 24.72!~ 2 18.88!~ 2 5.40!~ 2 2.65!~ 1.04!~ 2.92!~ 4.23!~ 5.28!~ 4.74!~ 3.61!
Low volume ~R1V1! 0.19 0.46 0.48 0.37 0.32 0.57 0.10 21.58 21.79 0.02 0.44 0.77 1.08 1.26 1.30 1.10 1.08
~1.18!~ 2.95!~ 2.26!~ 2.69!~ 2.03!~ 2.79!~ 0.73!~ 2 15.21!~ 2 13.20!~ 0.13!~ 2.64!~ 4.90!~ 5.41!~ 6.97!~ 6.96!~ 7.77!~ 5.58!
High volume ~R1V3! 0.23 0.43 0.62 0.52 0.30 0.01 20.69 22.79 22.93 21.06 20.68 20.45 20.12 0.08 0.23 0.12 0.15
~2.12!~ 4.20!~ 5.03!~ 4.24!~ 2.17!~ 0.05!~ 2 5.60!~ 2 20.07!~ 2 16.58!~ 2 6.71!~ 2 5.24!~ 2 4.47!~ 2 1.11!~ 0.57!~ 1.56!~ 0.92!~ 0.92!
Difference ~R1V1 2 R1V3! 20.05 0.02 20.14 20.15 0.02 0.57 0.79 1.22 1.14 1.08 1.12 1.22 1.20 1.18 1.08 0.98 0.93
~20.29!~ 0.14!~ 2 0.61!~ 2 1.02!~ 0.12!~ 2.77!~ 4.95!~ 7.18!~ 6.94!~ 6.13!~ 7.09!~ 7.68!~ 5.77!~ 6.18!~ 6.03!~ 6.19!~ 4.09!
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R10 0.51 0.52 0.45 0.36 0.50 0.91 1.37 3.23 2.95 0.89 1.01 0.56 0.09 0.10 0.17 0.09 0.10
~5.52!~ 5.19!~ 4.83!~ 4.69!~ 5.20!~ 8.44!~ 10.70!~ 19.67!~ 18.48!~ 9.09!~ 8.71!~ 6.68!~ 1.04!~ 1.40!~ 1.99!~ 1.17!~ 1.32!
Low volume ~R10V1! 0.90 0.64 0.75 0.36 0.52 0.91 1.49 3.57 4.08 1.70 1.77 1.15 0.37 0.56 0.68 0.69 0.47
~5.47!~ 3.53!~ 3.74!~ 2.33!~ 2.93!~ 5.30!~ 6.26!~ 17.75!~ 19.12!~ 7.81!~ 7.89!~ 6.79!~ 2.08!~ 3.62!~ 4.23!~ 3.66!~ 2.53!
High volume ~R10V3! 0.41 0.41 0.40 0.30 0.59 0.96 1.43 3.16 2.54 0.48 0.67 0.31 20.13 20.14 20.17 20.18 20.17
~4.06!~ 3.76!~ 4.22!~ 3.63!~ 4.42!~ 7.38!~ 9.99!~ 16.25!~ 15.47!~ 4.93!~ 6.15!~ 3.41!~ 2 1.30!~ 2 1.53!~ 2 1.82!~ 2 1.95!~ 2 1.75!
Difference ~R10V1 2 R10V3! 0.49 0.24 0.35 0.06 20.06 20.04 0.06 0.41 1.54 1.22 1.09 0.84 0.50 0.70 0.85 0.87 0.64
~3.29!~ 1.26!~ 1.79!~ 0.41!~ 2 0.32!~ 2 0.27!~ 0.23!~ 1.88!~ 8.37!~ 5.55!~ 5.42!~ 4.85!~ 2.72!~ 4.43!~ 5.69!~ 4.27!~ 3.16!
Panel C: Volume Portfolios
Low volume ~V1! 0.37 0.51 0.42 0.39 0.33 0.43 0.36 0.41 0.48 0.61 0.63 0.62 0.61 0.71 0.67 0.63 0.62
~5.27!~ 6.84!~ 6.06!~ 6.49!~ 4.56!~ 5.77!~ 5.46!~ 6.17!~ 6.98!~ 8.17!~ 8.68!~ 8.75!~ 6.99!~ 8.44!~ 8.99!~ 8.89!~ 7.45!
High volume ~V3! 0.34 0.43 0.45 0.41 0.42 0.46 0.41 0.33 0.10 0.01 0.08 0.05 20.02 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.18
~4.64!~ 6.60!~ 6.89!~ 6.38!~ 5.33!~ 6.23!~ 5.24!~ 4.44!~ 1.41!~ 0.16!~ 1.23!~ 0.90!~ 2 0.34!~ 0.17!~ 0.59!~ 0.38!~ 1.49!
Difference ~V1 2 V3! 0.03 0.08 20.02 20.03 20.09 20.03 20.06 0.08 0.37 0.60 0.55 0.57 0.63 0.70 0.63 0.61 0.44
~0.47!~ 1.22!~ 2 0.37!~ 2 0.45!~ 2 1.29!~ 2 0.41!~ 2 0.73!~ 1.19!~ 5.71!~ 9.77!~ 10.28!~ 9.62!~ 7.84!~ 9.39!~ 12.68!~ 8.25!~ 6.62!
Panel D: Comparing Trading Strategies
Simple price momentum ~R10 2 R1! 0.36 0.12 20.02 20.04 0.24 0.66 1.70 5.41 5.37 1.53 1.30 0.46 20.24 20.39 20.48 20.41 20.46
~3.51!~ 1.58!~ 2 0.15!~ 2 0.45!~ 2.17!~ 5.57!~ 14.21!~ 29.89!~ 27.13!~ 12.61!~ 10.14!~ 4.47!~ 2 2.03!~ 2 3.48!~ 2 3.53!~ 2 3.47!~ 2 3.09!
Early-stage price momentum ~R10V1 2 R1V3! 0.66 0.21 0.12 20.16 0.22 0.91 2.17 6.36 7.00 2.76 2.44 1.60 0.50 0.48 0.46 0.56 0.28
~3.70!~ 1.15!~ 0.56!~ 2 0.82!~ 1.13!~ 4.20!~ 8.59!~ 26.09!~ 23.75!~ 11.54!~ 11.26!~ 7.65!~ 2.39!~ 2.35!~ 2.35!~ 2.37!~ 1.14!
Late-stage price momentum ~R10V3 2 R1V1! 0.22 20.05 20.08 20.07 0.27 0.38 1.33 4.73 4.32 0.46 0.23 20.45 21.18 21.47 21.43 21.27 21.25
~1.62!~ 2 0.39!~ 2 0.40!~ 2 0.53!~ 1.63!~ 1.92!~ 7.76!~ 23.55!~ 23.23!~ 2.79!~ 1.40!~ 2 2.83!~ 2 5.60!~ 2 7.15!~ 2 6.81!~ 2 8.50!~ 2 5.30!
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Annual Industry Adjusted Returns of Portfolios Based on Price Momentum
and Change in Trading Volume
This table presents annual industry-adjusted returns for portfolios based on price momentum and change in trading volume using data on
NYSE0AMEX stocks from 1968 to 1995. The portfolio strategies are based on the six month portfolio formation period ~J 5 6!. R1 represents the
loser portfolio with the lowest returns, and R5 represents the winner portfolio with the highest returns during the previous six months. DV1
represents the portfolio with the smallest increase ~or the largest decrease! in trading volume, and DV5 represents the portfolio with the largest
increase in trading volume over the past four years. Specifically, if the 12-month period just prior to the portfolio formation date is defined as
year t, then we define change in volume as the average daily turnover in the past six months ~the final six months of year t! minus the average
daily turnover in year t 2 4, DV 5 V~6, t! 2 V~t 2 4!. Year 1, Year 2, Year 3, Year 4, and Year 5 represent the annual returns of price momentum
portfolios in the five 12-month periods following the portfolio formation date. The industry adjustment is based on 25 equal-weighted industry
portfolios ~described in the text! formed by grouping two-digit SIC codes. The benchmark portfolios are formed on the portfolio formation date
using all NYSE0AMEX firms available at that time. The benchmark-adjusted returns are computed by subtracting the annual returns of the
appropriate benchmark portfolio ~a portfolio that corresponds to the industry grouping of the stock at the time of the portfolio formation! from
the individual stock’s annual returns. The annual portfolio returns are computed as an equal-weighted average of annual returns of the indi-
vidual stocks in the portfolio. The numbers in parentheses represent t-statistics based on the Hansen–Hodrick correction for autocorrelation up
to lag 11.
DV1 DV3 DV5 DV5 2D V 1
Portfolio Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
R1 24.29 21.82 0.14 2.84 1.90 23.39 20.05 0.33 20.77 0.04 29.40 23.85 23.04 22.12 21.43 25.11 22.04 23.18 24.95 23.33
~23.17!~ 2 1.55!~ 0.10!~ 2.04!~ 1.85!~ 2 3.96!~ 2 0.06!~ 0.36!~ 2 0.97!~ 0.06!~ 2 10.72!~ 2 4.66!~ 2 2.71!~ 2 1.86!~ 2 2.27!~ 2 3.09!~ 2 1.31!~ 2 2.21!~ 2 3.26!~ 2 3.04!
R3 1.91 1.21 1.01 1.93 1.12 2.29 0.94 0.35 0.58 0.33 22.70 22.06 21.95 23.49 21.64 24.61 23.27 22.96 25.42 22.76
~2.54!~ 1.86!~ 1.38!~ 2.47!~ 1.74!~ 3.90!~ 1.57!~ 0.59!~ 0.97!~ 0.74!~ 2 3.25!~ 2 2.36!~ 2 2.63!~ 2 5.55!~ 2 2.96!~ 2 3.17!~ 2 2.29!~ 2 2.43!~ 2 4.43!~ 2 2.71!
R5 4.03 0.24 0.61 2.00 1.13 4.64 0.91 0.63 20.05 20.25 21.45 22.12 22.23 23.14 22.70 25.49 22.36 22.84 25.14 23.83
~3.01!~ 0.23!~ 0.51!~ 2.14!~ 1.07!~ 5.28!~ 1.49!~ 0.73!~ 2 0.09!~ 2 0.39!~ 2 1.54!~ 2 2.35!~ 2 3.47!~ 2 4.29!~ 2 3.23!~ 2 3.75!~ 2 1.94!~ 2 2.01!~ 2 3.71!~ 2 3.73!
R5 2 R1 8.32 2.05 0.47 20.84 20.77 8.03 0.96 0.30 0.72 20.29 7.94 1.73 0.81 21.03 21.27 20.38 20.32 0.34 20.19 20.50
~5.22!~ 1.70!~ 0.26!~ 2 0.51!~ 2 0.58!~ 5.87!~ 0.80!~ 0.20!~ 0.66!~ 2 0.27!~ 5.91!~ 1.61!~ 0.64!~ 2 0.98!~ 2 1.66!~ 2 0.26!~ 2 0.24!~ 0.22!~ 2 0.12!~ 2 0.43!
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epast four years ~DV!. Specifically, if the 12-month period just prior to the
portfolio formation date is defined as year t, then we define change in vol-
ume as the average daily turnover over the past six months minus the aver-
age daily turnover in year t 2 4 ~DV 5 V~6,t! 2 V~t 2 4!!.20 Using percentage
change in trading volume rather than actual change ~~DV 5 ~V~6, t! 2
V~t24!!0V~t24!! yields very similar results. We find that the level of trading
volume is positively correlated with the change in trading volume. The Spear-
man rank correlation between these two variables is 0.48.
Table XI shows that portfolios ranked on price momentum and changes in
trading volume exhibit the same patterns in future returns as those ranked
on price momentum and level of trading volume. For example, the bottom
row shows that returns to simple price momentum strategies dissipate in 12
months. However, the last five columns show that firms with the most in-
crease in volume significantly underperform firms with the least increase
~or the most decline! in volume. The difference ranges from two percent to
five percent over the next five years and is equally strong in winner and
loser portfolios.
Table XII compares the predictive power of the following: ~1! average trad-
ing volume from the past six months, ~2! changes in trading volume over the
past four years, and ~3! lagged trading volume from four years ago ~we en-
sure comparability by using only a subsample of stocks for which all three
volume measures are available!. Panel A reports early and late strategy
returns based on last six-month trading volume. Panel B reports the results
for changes in trading volume measured relative to the trading volume in
Year t 2 4. Finally, Panel C reports the results using only trading volume
from Year t 2 4.
The last two rows of each panel reports the incremental returns to the
volume metric, controlling for price momentum. These results show that
most of the predictive power comes from changes in trading volume, rather
than lagged volume. The last two rows of Panel C show that lagged volume
from four years ago has some predictive power for future returns but the
effect is not statistically significant in any of the next five years. Conversely,
Panel B shows that the change in trading volume has significant incremen-
tal predictive power. With two exceptions ~Years 2 and 3 in the early strat-
egy!, this predictive power is statistically significant over each of the next
five years for both the late strategy and the early strategy.
It is important to recognize the imprecise nature of this test. Specifically,
this test assumes that we can parse past trading volume into a “normal” and
an “abnormal” component using a fixed time interval of four years for all
firms. This is a strong assumption, and the imprecision it introduces may
20 We chose the four-year horizon because it measures changes in trading volume over a
fairly long period but not so long that we have data availability problems. The use of a longer
horizon is also driven by the empirical fact that the level of trading volume ~turnover! is a very
slowly mean reverting process. Changes measured over a three-year horizon also provide sim-
ilar results.
Price Momentum and Trading Volume 2059Table XII
Early and Late Strategies Based on Price Momentum and
Current, Lagged, and the Change in Trading Volume
This table summarizes raw annual returns from early ~R5V1 2 R1V5! and late stage ~R5V5 2 R1V1!
price momentum and trading volume strategies and compares them to the returns from a simple price
momentum strategy ~R5 2 R1! for the sample period 1965 to 1995. Early represents a zero invest-
ment portfolio that is long low volume winners ~R5V1! and short high volume losers ~R1V5!. Late
represents a zero investment portfolio that is long high volume winners ~R5V5! and short low volume
losers ~R1V1!. R1 represents the loser portfolio with the lowest returns, and R5 represents the winner
portfolio with the highest returns during the previous six months. V1 represents the portfolio with the
lowest trading volume, and V5 represents the portfolio with the highest trading volume. Trading volume
is measured in three ways: ~a! the average daily turnover during the past six months, ~b! the change in
trading volume, defined as the average daily turnover during the past six months minus the average
daily turnover four years ago, and ~c! the average daily turnover four years ago. Year 1, Year 2, Year 3,
Year 4, and Year 5 represent the compounded returns in each of the five 12-month periods following the
portfolio formation month. The number of monthly observations is 289. The numbers within parenthe-
ses are t-statistics computed with the Hansen–Hodrick ~1980! autocorrelation correction up to 11 lags.
Strategy Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Panel A: Last Six-Month Trading Volume
R5 2 R1 ~simple! 8.38 0.26 0.90 21.57 22.40
~4.75!~ 0.20!~ 0.51!~ 2 1.09!~ 2 1.77!
R5V5 2 R1V1 ~late! 0.00 24.23 24.10 26.04 25.19
~0.00!~ 2 1.87!~ 2 2.27!~ 2 3.97!~ 2 2.59!
R5V1 2 R1V5 ~early! 15.39 5.23 6.67 2.42 20.80
~6.94!~ 2.60!~ 2.72!~ 0.94!~ 2 0.40!
~R5V5 2 R1V1! 2 ~R5 2 R1! 28.38 24.49 25.00 24.47 22.78
~24.60!~ 2 2.79!~ 2 3.99!~ 2 2.97!~ 2 1.85!
~R5V1 2 R1V5! 2 ~R5 2 R1! 7.02 4.97 5.77 4.00 1.60
~3.35!~ 2.30!~ 2.99!~ 2.26!~ 0.84!
Panel B: Change in Trading Volume
R5 2 R1 ~simple! 8.38 0.26 0.90 21.57 22.40
~4.75!~ 0.20!~ 0.51!~ 2 1.09!~ 2 1.77!
R5V5 2 R1V1 ~late! 4.00 20.82 22.30 26.71 25.11
~1.63!~ 2 0.37!~ 2 0.97!~ 2 3.09!~ 2 2.80!
R5V1 2 R1V5 ~early! 15.64 3.59 3.68 4.24 2.96
~6.65!~ 2.26!~ 1.61!~ 1.87!~ 2.25!
~R5V5 2 R1V1! 2 ~R5 2 R1! 24.38 21.08 23.21 25.14 22.71
~23.29!~ 2 0.78!~ 2 2.55!~ 2 3.68!~ 2 3.31!
~R5V1 2 R1V5! 2 ~R5 2 R1! 7.26 3.33 2.78 5.82 5.36
~3.06!~ 1.76!~ 1.51!~ 3.15!~ 4.03!
Panel C: Trading Volume Lagged Four Years
R5 2 R1 ~simple! 8.38 0.26 0.90 21.57 22.40
~4.75!~ 0.20!~ 0.51!~ 2 1.09!~ 2 1.77!
R5V5 2 R1V1 ~late! 4.56 23.69 20.97 20.21 20.68
~1.67!~ 2 1.63!~ 2 0.43!~ 2 0.11!~ 2 0.33!
R5V1 2 R1V5 ~early! 11.44 2.69 2.23 22.36 23.01
~4.21!~ 1.09!~ 0.78!~ 2 0.85!~ 2 1.52!
~R5V5 2 R1V1! 2 ~R5 2 R1! 23.81 23.96 21.87 1.37 1.73
~21.54!~ 2 1.87!~ 2 1.02!~ 0.60!~ 0.83!
~R5V1 2 R1V5! 2 ~R5 2 R1! 3.07 2.42 1.33 20.78 20.61
~1.53!~ 1.21!~ 0.65!~ 2 0.41!~ 2 0.42!
2060 The Journal of Financeexplain why both the changes and lagged volume variables have some pre-
dictive power. Despite this limitation, Table XII results show that most of the
predictive power of trading volume is attributable to recent changes in the
level of trading activity rather than lagged volume. This evidence further
supports the notion that past turnover is a measure of fluctuating investor
sentiment and not a liquidity proxy.
E. Relation to Existing Behavioral Models of Under- and Overreaction
Our results show trading volume is an important empirical link between
intermediate-horizon momentum and long-horizon return reversal. Recently,
several behavioral models have attempted to provide a framework for inte-
grating these two empirical phenomena ~e.g., Daniel et al. ~1998!, Barberis
et al. ~1998!, and Hong and Stein ~1999!!. In this subsection, we briefly
summarize each model and discuss their relation to our findings.
Daniel et al. ~1998! focus on the overconfidence bias. They argue that stocks
that are more difficult to value tend to generate greater overconfidence among
investors. Therefore, according to their model, mispricing should be more
severe among securities that are hard to value ~i.e., growth or glamour stocks!
or where feedback is slow or ambiguous ~i.e., small, illiquid stocks!. If high
volume stocks tend to be growth or glamour stocks, then Daniel et al. would
predict that price momentum profits should be stronger among the high
volume stocks. This is consistent with our finding that high volume stocks
tend to behave like glamour stocks ~see Table V and, for more direct evi-
dence, Table VIII!. It may also help explain our intermediate-horizon finding
that momentum spreads ~profits on R10 2 R1 strategies! are greater among
high volume firms.
In Barberis et al. ~1998!, the conservatism bias of the representative in-
vestor causes him to update his priors insufficiently when he observes new
public information about a firm. This leads to an initial market underreac-
tion. However, due to the representativeness bias, when an investor receives
a long sequence of good ~or bad! news he tends to become too optimistic ~or
pessimistic! about the future profitability of the firm. As a result, firms
experiencing prolonged periods of increasing earnings tend to become over-
valued, and those experiencing long periods of declining earnings tend to
become undervalued. The prices of these stocks ultimately undergo reversals
as realized earnings fail to meet expectations.
In Hong and Stein ~1999! there are two types of investors: news watchers
and momentum traders. The news watchers trade only on private informa-
tion about fundamentals, whereas the momentum traders trade only on past
price movements. Both are boundedly rational in the sense they ignore all
other information. Given these rationality constraints, Hong and Stein show
that if firm-specific information diffuses gradually across news watchers,
there will be an initial underreaction. This underreaction in turn allows
momentum traders to make money by trend chasing. As more and more
momentum traders arrive in the market, the initial underreaction inevitably
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a context for reconciling the dynamics of intermediate-horizon underreac-
tion and long-horizon overreaction.
The main appeal of these models is their synthesis of intermediate-
horizon underreaction and long-horizon overreaction. Each model presents
a plausible explanation for these empirical observations. In addition, each
model has specific features that help explain some aspect of our findings.
However, the main limitation of these models, as they pertain to our tests, is
that none have an explicit role for trading volume. Therefore, the directional
predictions we discuss below are inferred from each model’s underlying
assumptions.
The models fall into two camps in terms of their explanation of the
intermediate-horizon momentum effect. In Daniel et al. ~1998!~ and also in
DeLong et al. ~1990!!, prices initially overreact to news about fundamentals,
and continue to move further away, before ultimately reverting to funda-
mentals. Therefore, in Daniel et al. ~1998! and DeLong et al. ~1990!, the
positive autocorrelation in intermediate-horizon returns is due to a market
overreaction. In contrast, both Barberis et al. ~1998! and Hong and Stein
~1999! characterize the intermediate-horizon momentum effect as a market
underreaction. In Barberis et al. ~1998!, the underreaction arises because
the representative investor does not update sufficiently when he observes a
firm-specific public news event. In Hong and Stein ~1999!, insufficient dif-
fusion of information across news watchers results in a gradual incorpora-
tion of information into prices.
Our volume-based results do not fit neatly into either of these frame-
works. For example, the Hong and Stein ~1999! model predicts that momen-
tum profits should be larger for stocks with slower information diffusion. If
we make the assumption that scarcity of trading leads to insufficient diffu-
sion of information, then the Hong and Stein model would predict a greater
momentum effect among low volume stocks. Our results indicate this to be
true among winners but not among losers. That is, low volume winners have
greater momentum, but low volume losers actually have less momentum. In
addition, our results show that price momentum strategies actually perform
better among high volume stocks. Therefore, the evidence does not seem to
support the view that volume is an information diffusion proxy at intermedi-
ate and long horizons.
Conversely, in Daniel et al. ~1998! and DeLong et al. ~1990!, the implicit
assumption is that high trading volume will “fuel” momentum. For example,
in Daniel et al. ~1998!, momentum arises from positive feedback traders that
seek to capitalize on an initial price move by buying ~selling! on good ~bad!
news. If we assume that trading volume is a proxy for positive feedback
trading, or the activity of overconfident traders, then these models predict
greater momentum among high volume stocks ~in the case of Daniel et al.
this is because high volume stocks are glamour stocks that are more difficult
to value!. We find this is true among losers but not among winners both in
intermediate and long horizons. High volume losers do continue to lose
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opposite is true: high volume winners continue to win for a shorter period
than low volume winners; indeed, high volume winners do worse than low
volume winners over the next two to five years. Thus, the fact that at in-
termediate horizons, momentum profits ~R10 2 R1! are higher among high
volume stocks is not because volume “fuels” price momentum.
F. Momentum Life Cycle (MLC)
An intriguing explanation for the above findings is depicted in Figure 4.
This figure presents a simple conceptual diagram that helps to integrate the
evidence in this paper. We refer to this diagram as the momentum life cycle
~MLC! hypothesis.21 The main benefit of this graph is that it presents the
interaction between price momentum, reversals, and trading volume in a
single framework. The main disadvantage is that it implies more rigidity
and regularity than are warranted by the evidence to date. We present it
here as an intriguing possibility that merits further research.
According to this hypothesis, stocks experience periods of investor favor-
itism and neglect. A stock with positive price and0or earning momentum
~past winner! would be on the left half of the cycle, whereas a stock with
21 This diagram closely parallels the intuition presented in Bernstein ~1993, 1995!. However,
Bernstein does not discuss the role of trading volume.
Figure 4. Momentum investing based on past price and volume information. This fig-
ure illustrates some of the more salient features of our empirical findings. We find that low
volume stocks generally outperform high volume stocks. Among winners, low volume stocks
show greater persistence in price momentum. Among losers, high volume stocks show greater
persistence in price momentum. In addition, low volume ~high volume! firms exhibit many
characteristics most commonly associated with value ~glamour! stocks.
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half of the cycle. Growth stocks that experience positive news move up the
cycle, but eventually these stocks disappoint the market and are “tor-
pedoed.” Stocks that disappoint begin a downward slide and eventually ex-
perience general neglect. If they fall far enough in price, they may become
attractive to contrarian investors.
Given this framework, our evidence suggests trading volume may provide
information useful in locating a given stock in its momentum0expectation
life cycle. Generally, when a stock falls into disfavor, its trading volume de-
clines. Conversely, when a stock is popular, its trading volume increases.
Viewed in this light, trading volume provides information on the degree of
investor favoritism ~or neglect! in a stock, or more precisely, the extent to
which market sentiment favors the stock at a particular point in time.
The MLC would characterize high volume winners and low volume losers
as late stage momentum stocks, in the sense that their price momentum is
more likely to reverse in the near future. Conversely low volume winners
and high volume losers are early stage momentum stocks, in the sense that
their momentum is more likely to persist in the near future. The MLC also
implies that trading volume should be correlated with value0glamour char-
acteristics. As a stock moves up the cycle, trading volume increases and it
becomes more “expensive” in terms of price-to-value measures. The higher
~lower! number of analysts following high ~low! volume stocks is also con-
sistent with this explanation. In fact, many of the relations between volume
and value characteristics are difficult to accommodate in any other expla-
nation that we are aware of.
We wish to stress the limitations of Figure 4. We have shown that, on
average, firms in each of the four quadrants of this cycle exhibit character-
istics that are consistent with the MLC hypothesis. However, these results
describe general tendencies at the portfolio level. For individual firms, things
are far less deterministic than the figure implies. Individual firms do not
necessarily exhibit expectation cycles of the same frequency. Nor does each
firm need to pass through all phases of the cycle each time. The turning
points for individual firms may appear random and difficult to pinpoint,
even though the portfolios in each quadrant conform to the predictions of
the MLC hypothesis.
The MLC diagram also does not explain the asymmetric volume effect in
Year 1. Specifically, the fact that the price momentum effect is more pro-
nounced among high volume stocks is not predicted by this explanation. Nor
does the diagram explain why volume might decline as a stock falls out of
favor. There are no extant models that formally address this question. One
possibility is the disposition effect, or the tendency of investors to hold on to
losing investments too long ~see Odean ~1998!!. According to the disposition
effect, as a stock falls out of favor, investors who own the stock become more
reluctant to realize their losses. This unwillingness to sell by its owners,
coupled with general neglect from potential investors, may be the reason for
the decline in trading volume.
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trading volume captures investors’ disagreement about a stock’s intrinsic
value. In general, glamour stocks tend to be high growth stocks that are
difficult to value. This could result in greater disagreement among inves-
tors about their intrinsic values and therefore higher trading volume.
Interpreted in this context, stocks at the bottom of the MLC tend to have
less investor disagreement, whereas stocks at the top of their MLC ~late
winners and early losers! tend to have more investor disagreement. The
question that remains is why the degree of investor disagreement would
vary over the MLC. Clearly, a more complete theoretical framework would
be helpful.
V. Conclusion
Price and volume are simultaneously determined in equilibrium. What-
ever process generates price also gives rise to the accompanying trading
volume. Trading volume is also a widely available market statistic. There-
fore, it is perhaps not surprising that both financial academics ~e.g., Blume
et al. ~1994!! and practitioners ~e.g., various technical chartists! have recog-
nized the potential usefulness of trading volume in investment decisions.
What is surprising is how little we really know about trading volume.
In this study, we have begun the process of understanding the role of
trading volume in the prediction of cross-sectional stock returns. Our find-
ings establish several important regularities about the role of trading vol-
ume in predicting cross-sectional returns. First, we show that trading volume,
as measured by the turnover ratio, is unlikely to be a liquidity proxy. Al-
though high ~low! volume firms earn lower ~higher! future returns, the op-
posite is true in the past. Trading volume is not highly correlated with firm
size or relative bid-ask spread, and the volume effect is independent of the
firm size effect.
Rather, our evidence shows that the information content of trading volume
is related to market misperceptions of firms’ future earnings prospects. Spe-
cifically, we provide strong evidence that low ~high! volume stocks tend to be
under- ~over-! valued by the market. This evidence includes past operating
and market performance, current valuation multiples and operating perfor-
mance, and future operating performance and earnings surprises. One im-
plication of our finding is that investor expectations affect not only a stock’s
returns but also its trading activity.
Second, our results show that the effect of trading volume on price mo-
mentum is more complex than prior research suggests. Neither of the two
most common views about volume’s effect on price momentum ~i.e., the “fuel-
ing” hypothesis and the “diffusion” hypothesis! captures the stylized facts. In
fact, we find volume “fuels” momentum only for losers and it helps informa-
tion “diffusion” only for winners. These facts should provide further guid-
ance to researchers interested in modeling the market dynamics that give
rise to returns and volume.
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and Titman ~1993! eventually reverses and that the timing of this reversal is
predictable based on past trading volume. Specifically, we show that it is
possible to create Jegadeesh and Titman–type momentum portfolios ~win-
ners minus losers! that exhibit long-horizon return reversals of the type first
documented by DeBondt and Thaler ~1985!. This finding represents an im-
portant conceptual shift in the literature. Previous studies have generally
viewed intermediate-horizon momentum and long-horizon price reversal as
two separate phenomena. Our results show that trading volume provides an
important link between these two effects.
Finally, we show that existing theories of investor behavior do not fully
account for all of the evidence. Models presented in Daniel et al. ~1998!,
Barberis et al. ~1998!, and Hong and Stein ~1999! capture the spirit of our
findings, in that they model prices as initially underreacting, and ultimately
overreacting, to fundamental news. However, none of these models incorpo-
rate trading volume explicitly and, therefore, they cannot fully explain why
trading volume is able to predict the magnitude and persistence of future
price momentum.
To summarize our results, we suggest a simple conceptual diagram, which
we have dubbed the momentum life cycle ~MLC! hypothesis. According to the
MLC hypothesis, firms move through periods of relative glamour and ne-
glect. We suggest that trading volume may play a useful role in identifying
where a stock is in this cycle. When stocks decline in popularity, their trad-
ing volume drops and they become neglected. When stocks increase in pop-
ularity, their trading volume increases.22
Our findings have important implications for the debate on market effi-
ciency. The ability of past trading volume to predict future returns ~and
earnings surprises! implies prices do not generally equal fundamental val-
ues. Indeed, our results suggest that the market is better characterized as
being in a constant state of convergence toward intrinsic value.23 Viewed in
this light, intermediate-horizon “underreaction” and long-horizon “overreac-
tion” are simply two elements of the same continuous process by which prices
impound new information. This characterization of the price adjustment pro-
cess is consistent with our findings and with the behavioral models we dis-
cuss in this paper.
Our results also raise at least three interesting questions for future re-
search. First, the asymmetry in the timing of momentum reversals between
winners and losers remains a puzzle. We show that low volume losers re-
bound quickly and outperform high volume losers within the next three to
22 We stress that this framework applies only at the portfolio level. We show that the firms
in each quadrant of the cycle behave, on average, as predicted by the MLC hypothesis. However,
these results reflect mean behavior at the portfolio level. At the individual firm level, things
are far less deterministic than the figure implies, and turning points are far less predictable.
23 See Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan ~1999! for a more formal econometric specification of
this concept.
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to significantly outperform high volume winners. We know of no explanation
for this timing difference. Second, with the possible exception of the dispo-
sition effect from the behavioral literature, we know of no explanation for
why trading volume should decline when firms fall out of favor. We believe
more robust models of investor behavior, which incorporate fluctuations in
the level of trading activity, are needed to explain this finding.
Finally, we find it remarkable that measures as readily available as past
returns and trading volume can have such strong predictive power for re-
turns. The magnitude of these returns is likely to be lower under practical
implementation. However, given the popularity of price momentum strat-
egies, the improvement gained by also conditioning on past volume appears
economically significant. Why this information is not fully reflected in cur-
rent prices is another puzzle we leave for future research. In the meantime,
we remain agnostic as to the prediction that this phenomenon will yield
positive abnormal returns in future periods.
Appendix. Industry Benchmarks
To control for industry effects in our return calculations, we construct 25
equal-weighted industry portfolios. The industry portfolios are formed monthly,
from January 1965 to December 1995, using two-digit CRSP SIC codes. The
following table lists the industry groupings and their corresponding SIC codes.
All NYSE0AMEX firms available at the time of portfolio formation are in-
cluded. The benchmark-adjusted returns are computed by subtracting the
annual returns of the appropriate benchmark portfolio ~a portfolio that cor-
responds to the industry grouping of the stock at the time of the portfolio
formation! from each individual stock’s annual returns. The annual portfolio
returns are computed as an equal-weighted average of the returns of indi-
vidual stocks.
Industry SIC Code
1 Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 01–09
2 Mining, minerals, oil, and gas 10–14
3 Construction 15–17, 25, 32
4 Food and beverage 20
5 Tobacco products 21
6 Textile and apparel 22–23
7 Paper products 26
8 Printing and publishing 27
9 Chemicals 28
10 Petroleum 29
11 Rubber 30
12 Leather 31
13 Primary and fabricated metals 33–34
14 Machinery and electrical equipment 35–36
15 Transportation equipment 37
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16 Manufacturing 38–39
17 Transportation 40–47
18 Communication and utilities 48–49
19 Wholesale 50–51
20 Retail 52–59
21 Finance and real estate 60–67
22 Services 70–76, 81–89
23 Entertainment 78–79
24 Health care 80
25 Other .89
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